

Rooting for the same team: Shared social identities in a polarized context*

Nicolás Ajzenman[†] Bruno Ferman[‡] Pedro C. Sant’Anna[§]

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Abstract

Can shared identities help overcome political divides in polarized settings? We answer this question with a field experiment on Twitter during the Brazilian 2022 elections. Although both congruence in political (supporting the same candidate) and affective (rooting for the same football team) identities increase follow-backs and reduce blocks, the positive effect of shared affective identity weakens when information on political identity is available. Using observational live-streamed data from Twitter during the 2022 World Cup, we complement our analysis by exploring the public political leaning of Brazilian players. Analyzing the content of tweets posted by Brazilian nationals during the country’s games, we document significant differences in fans’ reactions depending on their political alignment with the specific players that triggered relevant events in the game. Our results indicate that political identity can hinder the potential of other shared identities to reduce political divides and foster social cohesion.

Keywords: Social Identity; Affective Polarization; Brazilian Elections; Social Media.

JEL Codes: D72; D91; C93; Z20.

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[†]McGill University, São Paulo School of Economics and IZA. E-mail: nicolas.ajzenman@mcgill.ca

[‡]São Paulo School of Economics - FGV. E-mail: bruno.ferman@fgv.br

[§]MIT. E-mail: p_stanna@mit.edu

1 Introduction

Affective polarization, the extent of out-group animosity and in-group favoritism based on political preferences, has been growing recently in many countries (Iyengar et al., 2019; Boxell et al., 2022). Such polarization can have substantial negative effects on interpersonal relations (Huber and Malhotra, 2017; Chen and Rohla, 2018), democratic norms, and social cohesion (Iyengar et al., 2019). While this phenomenon stems from the fact that individuals increasingly consider their political preference as a core element of their social identity (Huddy et al., 2015; Van Bavel and Packer, 2021), there are several other non-political identities with which individuals can identify (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). When shared, these identities — rooting for the same football team, belonging to the same family or nation, etc. — may be important to build social cohesion. Therefore, a crucial question is whether the cohesive power of sharing other common identities is enough to soften the detrimental consequences of political polarization; or whether political identities are so strong as to overshadow those other identities, thus preventing the formation of social ties that otherwise could have flourished. This paper explores these questions using experimental and observational methods in a highly polarized country: Brazil (Ortellado et al., 2022; Wagner, 2021).

In our experimental analysis, we study the interplay between congruence in political identity and congruence in preference for a Brazilian football club in forming social ties among Twitter users (follow-back and block rates).¹ We interpret preference for a club as a social identity, as football is a crucial element of Brazilian culture (DaMatta, 1994) — and call it “affective” identity in opposition to political identity. Then, using live-streamed data from Twitter during the 2022 FIFA World Cup, we complement our analysis by exploiting the fact that some Brazilian players had a public political leaning — potentially reducing the power of national identification for cross-partisans. More specifically, we study the reactions on Twitter of Brazilian nationals to positive and negative events that happened during the country’s games (goals, injuries) as a function of the congruence or incongruence between the political identities of supporters and of the specific players who were the protagonists of these events. Both approaches point to the same conclusion: in a politically polarized setting, political identity overshadows other social identities or, at least, heavily diminishes their cohesive power.

For the experimental approach, we conducted a pre-registered trial on Twitter in the second semester of 2022, before, after, and during the 2022 Brazilian presidential election campaign.² We created fictional accounts that signaled their preferred candidate in this election (either Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva or Jair Messias Bolsonaro, the two candidates

¹We use the term “football” instead of “soccer” to refer to the sport “association football”. This is the usual practice in most of the literature in social sciences studying this sport in the Brazilian context. Notably, football in Brazil is characterized by clubs with historical rivalries, and the set of supporters of rival clubs creates a division in society that is relatively uncorrelated with political preferences or other societal divides such as income levels (Ronconi, 2022).

²AEA RCT Registry ID AEARCTR-0009982. The experiment was approved by the Ethical Compliance Committee on Research Involving Human Beings at Fundação Getulio Vargas with a waiver of informed consent (CEPH/FGV, IRB approval n. 208/2022).

that have been the symbols of opposite sides of the political spectrum in Brazil in the last few years) and their preferred football club. We also created neutral accounts in one of the two dimensions to study the effect of shared identity without conditioning on the other dimension. The accounts then randomly followed Twitter users with congruent and non-congruent identities across these two dimensions (political and affective). Finally, we computed the proportion of follow-backs and blocks that each bot received as measures of social ties between Twitter users and our experimental accounts.

Our measures of social ties capture two types of users' intentions. We interpret follow-backs — a standard measure in the literature (e.g., [Ajzenman et al., 2023](#); [Mosleh et al., 2021](#)) — as indicative of in-group positive affect. Blocks, on the other hand, are a novel measure in this literature, and we interpret them as indicative of out-group animosity, which is frequently pointed out as a key driver of behavior in social media ([Rathje et al., 2021](#)).³ Both follow-backs and blocks have important economic consequences, given that they determine the type of content to which users will be exposed ([Halberstam and Knight, 2016](#)).

We document two main experimental results. First, using accounts that signal a single dimension of identity (either affective or political), we find that identity congruence increases the probability of follow-backs and reduces the probability of blocks. More specifically, sharing affective identity causes an increase of 13.4 percentage points in follow-backs (or a 58.5% increase) relative to the case of opposite affective identities, while sharing political identity increases follow-backs by 20 pp (or a 119% increase) relative to opposite political identities. Moreover, sharing affective identity decreases the probability of blocks by 1.4 pp compared to supporting opposite clubs, and sharing political identity decreases the probability of blocks by 12.3 pp compared to preferring opposite candidates.

Second, using the experimental accounts that signal both dimensions of identity, we find that, although both dimensions of identity are relevant to forming ties, the political dimension is relatively more important, thus partially overshadowing the positive effects of sharing an affective identity. Different results illustrate this point. For instance, relative to the case in which bots and subjects are incongruent in both identity dimensions, becoming politically congruent (but not affectively) increases the probability of receiving a follow-back four times more than becoming affectively congruent (but not politically). More importantly, when information about political identity is available, the effect of sharing affective identity weakens. Indeed, when a bot is politically neutral, sharing affective identity increases the likelihood of follow-backs by 13.4 pp, but only by 4.3 pp when the bot and subject politically disagree. These results suggest that political identities can partially undermine social connections that could have been formed due to other shared identities in a context of intense affective polarization.

A more positive interpretation of our results is that, although less intensely, congruence in affective identity can improve cohesion even among politically incongruent individuals. Indeed, when individuals do not share a political identity, sharing an affective identity increases the follow-back probability by 27%. Even more encouraging, sharing an affective identity reduces the blocking probability by 42%. These results suggest that, while polar-

³Blocks indicate desires of avoidance or derogation. Through blocking, users forbid the blocked user from contacting them, seeing their posts, or commenting on their feed.

ization weakens the cohesive power of sharing other (non-political) identities, they are still important, particularly in reducing out-group animosity.

Although football teams are a crucial dimension of citizens’ identities in our setting, national identity could arguably be an even more powerful tool to forge social cohesion and overcome the detrimental effects of political polarization (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020). We thus complement our experimental results with observational data from live-streamed Tweets posted by Brazilian nationals during the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Exploring the fact that many football players from the national team had publicly endorsed political candidates before the tournament, we conduct a text analysis of the tweets posted by football fans during Brazil’s World Cup matches to study how (and whether) the political alignment of players and supporters impacted reactions to positive (such as a goal) or negative (such as an injury) event involving those players.

Specifically, we show that celebrations after goals scored by a player were more intense among politically congruent fans, and criticism towards the Brazilian coach after Brazil’s elimination was more intense among those who disagreed politically with him. For instance, immediately after Richarlison — a player who was vocally against Bolsonaro — scored in Brazil’s debut match in the tournament, pro-Lula Twitter users were significantly more likely to tweet than pro-Bolsonaro users. The effect persisted for hours after the match. Moreover, pro-Lula users were particularly likelier to post tweets with political content after this event, associating their celebrations with the player’s political alignment.⁴ While there is evidence that national football teams’ victories can foster national identity and increase social cohesion (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020), our results indicate that this effect may be reduced in a polarized setting: when polarization is strong enough, even football can become polarized. This observational evidence reinforces the experimental results’ interpretation by illustrating a different context in which political identities hindered interactions based on another (affective) identity — in this case, national identity. Taken together, the experimental and observational results indicate that the potential of shared identities to enhance cohesion and foster ties is reduced in the context of political polarization.

Our results contribute to several strands of the literature. First, our paper relates to the literature on affective polarization (Iyengar et al., 2012, 2019). While most of the literature on this topic uses surveys to measure polarization (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2012; Boxell et al., 2022; Wagner, 2021; Reiljan, 2020), our paper studies affective polarization in a natural setting, providing a behavioral, revealed-preference measure of this phenomenon. Similar to our case, some papers documented affective polarization using behavioral measures in different contexts (online dating behavior (Huber and Malhotra, 2017), family gatherings during holidays (Chen and Rohla, 2018), and connections on social media (Mosleh et al., 2021)). In particular, our paper is closely connected with Mosleh et al. (2021), who use a similar methodology to ours to study the effect of shared partisanship in the US on the formation of ties on Twitter. Our contribution relative to that paper is twofold. First, our

⁴For example, after Richarlison scored, one pro-Lula Twitter user tweeted: “*And who scored? One of the few decent players of this tiny national team, Richarlison c’mon! He voted for Lula, knows where he comes from, and honors his country’s jersey!*”. In Section 6, we show that this anecdotal example is not an exception, but rather part of a systematic behavior of Brazilian supporters during the World Cup.

paper explores the interplay between political and affective (non-political identities). This is particularly relevant as it advances our understanding of how and to what extent political identity overshadows other dimensions of shared identity. Second, by measuring follow-backs and blocks, we can separate the two dimensions of affective polarization: in-group favoritism and out-group animosity.

Our result of political incongruence overshadowing other affective identities is consistent with [Chen and Rohla \(2018\)](#), who show, using anonymized data from cellphones, that Thanksgiving dinners attended by individuals from opposing-party precincts were shorter on average than same-party dinners in 2016 (after the presidential election in the US), suggesting that political incongruence can even affect family cohesion. A challenge in ascribing a causal interpretation to the pattern they document is that partisan mismatch could be correlated with other individual characteristics that might lead to shorter gatherings. By creating experimental accounts that are identical apart from their political identity signal, we can more clearly study the causal effect of political mismatch on undermining affective ties derived from other shared identities. Moreover, by comparing accounts that do not signal political identity with accounts that do, we can isolate the effect of political polarization in overshadowing other identities.

Second, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of social cohesion.⁵ An important strand of this literature focuses on how contact through sport can foster cohesion between conflicting groups ([Lowe, 2021](#); [Mousa, 2020](#)). We are more closely related to two papers in this line. First, [Depetris-Chauvin et al. \(2020\)](#) show that individuals in Sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to identify with their nation than their ethnic group following important victories of their national football teams. Second, [Ronconi \(2022\)](#) finds that, in the days following a match between rival football clubs in Latin America, social cohesion tends to improve for those in regions where the match is relevant (not only for football fans), except when players behave violently. We contribute to this literature by studying the interplay between political identity and football club preference. Our result shows that, in a context of intense political polarization, the positive effects of sharing a football-related affective identity on cohesion could be severely weakened. Moreover, the observational evidence from Twitter during the World Cup (a setting more akin to [Depetris-Chauvin et al. \(2020\)](#)) suggests that even the identification with the national football team may have limited power to increase social cohesion in a polarized setting if polarization also permeates the players.

Third, we are related to the literature on social identity (e.g., [Tajfel and Turner, 1986](#)) introduced into economic analysis by [Akerlof and Kranton \(2000\)](#) and [Shayo \(2009, 2020\)](#).

⁵We also relate to the literature on the relationship between social media and social cohesion ([González-Bailón and Lelkes, 2022](#)). More generally, we connect to the literature on social media and politics, particularly the strand studying the welfare effects of social media ([Zhuravskaya et al., 2020](#)). The literature on this topic documents that social media has effects, among others, on protest participation ([Enikolopov et al., 2020](#); [Acemoglu et al., 2018](#)), expression of xenophobic views ([Bursztyn et al., 2019](#)), political polarization ([Allcott et al., 2020](#); [Di Tella et al., 2021](#)), and news consumption ([Levy, 2021](#)). By documenting homophily in the political dimension in the formation of social media ties, we contribute to this literature by providing evidence of a potential mechanism that could amplify the political effects of social media. At the same time, our results suggest a mechanism for fostering ties across partisan lines, possibly reducing polarization.

More recently, some papers have focused on studying the implications of social identity to a variety of relevant economic outcomes, such as trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 2021), teamwork (Charness and Chen, 2020), and acceptance of bonus payments (Bursztyn et al., 2020). We contribute to this literature by studying the interplay between two social categories, providing evidence on how different dimensions of identity interact in a natural setting and their effects on establishing social ties.

Our results are also crucially relevant in terms of policy, as digital technology is frequently pointed out as part of the cause of polarization (Gentzkow, 2016), as well as an environment that amplifies polarization through echo chambers (Sunstein, 2001, 2018). While many authors highlight that echo chambers can be created by algorithms’ recommendations (Epstein and Robertson, 2015), our results suggest that, in part, echo chambers are created by individuals choosing to sort with those who share their identities, even among individuals that are congruent in terms of non-political identities (and that thus could have had formed ties in the absence of political polarization). This sorting in terms of political preferences may have implications on the type of content and news consumed by these individuals (Levy, 2021; Halberstam and Knight, 2016) and on how likely it is for individuals to be exposed to dissenting views (Bursztyn et al., 2022), potentially increasing polarization.

However, the fact that sharing an affective identity can still have a positive effect, even if relatively small, in the formation of ties, emphasizes the importance of sports (football in particular) in fostering integration (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020). Thus, this result invites us to think of ways to make these commonalities more salient in order to increase their power to build cohesion and reduce polarization (Hartman et al., 2022).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide relevant background on polarization in Brazil, football, and Twitter, focusing on information relevant to the understanding of the experimental design and its results; then, in Section 3, we present our conceptual background, drawing upon Social Identity Theory; in Section 4, we detail our experimental design and empirical strategy; then, in Section 5 we present our experimental results; finally, in Section 6 we discuss our observational analysis of politically-biased reactions to Brazil’s performance during the World Cup, presenting the relevant background, as well as our data, empirical strategy, and results.

2 Background

2.1 Political Polarization in Brazil

For many analysts, Brazil’s relatively young democracy is currently “caught up in the sharpest and most polarizing moment in its history” (Kingstone and Power, 2017). This trend started at least in 2013, when millions of Brazilians went to the streets to protest against the political establishment. Since then, the country experienced an impeachment process against left-wing President Dilma Rousseff (of the Worker’s Party), who was accused of breaking budget laws, in 2016, and saw the election of far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro as president in 2018. In the 2018 elections run-off, as Mignozzetti and Spektor (2019) argue,

the country was presented with two choices — Jair Bolsonaro and Fernando Haddad, from the Worker’s Party — that represented opposite ends of the political spectrum, in sharp contrast with previous elections (that always featured at least one representative of traditional centrist parties). In 2022, Brazilian citizens faced a similar decision, this time having to choose between Jair Bolsonaro and Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the country’s former president and member of the Workers Party. The two candidates obtained over 90% of valid votes in the first election round — for comparison, in the three previous presidential elections, the two most voted candidates obtained less than 80% of votes in the first round. Moreover, in the 2022 election, the distance in valid votes between the two candidates was less than two percentage points in the run-off election, also much closer than in previous elections.⁶ These numbers are perhaps the clearest possible evidence that the country’s population was divided between those who support Bolsonaro and those who support Lula.

Apart from close voting shares, such polarization also manifested itself in violence between counter-partisans: during the 2022 presidential campaign, at least three cases of politically-motivated homicides involving common citizens were reported.⁷ Given the elevated level of political turmoil in recent years, it would not be surprising if polarization among the general Brazilian population had increased. Interestingly, while there is evidence that Brazil currently has low levels of ideological polarization both compared to other countries and to its history (Ortellado et al., 2022; Mignozzetti and Spektor, 2019), affective polarization has indeed increased recently in the country. This is similar to countries such as the United States, where ideological polarization (i.e., polarization in terms of issues or opinions) evolves much slower than affective polarization — possibly because affection is not always anchored on policy preferences (Iyengar et al., 2012).

To give a sense of the level of affective polarization currently experienced in Brazil, we use data from the Brazilian Electoral Study (BES), a nationally representative post-electoral survey undertaken by the Center of Studies on Public Opinion (CESOP) since 2002. This survey is part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project. We consider answers to the question “how much do you like each party?” as measures of the respondent’s affect towards each party.⁸ The results from our analysis are displayed in Figure 1. Following Boxell et al. (2022), we measure affective polarization among those who report identifying with a party as the distance between the affect towards this party and all other parties. Consistent with analysts’ views, affective polarization in Brazil seems to have reached a new high since 2018. Boxell et al. (2022) provide measures of affective polarization in the United States and other OECD countries, which allow us to compare polarization in this dimension in Brazil with that in other settings. Using this method, we find that the mean level of affective polarization in Brazil in 2022 (59.1) is comparable to (and even slightly greater than) that of the United States in 2020 (56.3) and higher than that of countries such as France (52.6 in 2017), Canada (37.7 in 2020), and Germany (28.5 in 2018). Moreover,

⁶Lula was elected with 50.90% of valid votes, against 49.10% for Bolsonaro in 2022.

⁷See, for instance, Reuters (09-09-2022), CNN (07-11-2022) and BBC News Brasil (10-05-2022).

⁸More precisely, the question asked is: “I’d like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party. If I come to a party you haven’t heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. The first party is PARTY A.”

Brazil experienced a positive trend in affective polarization, smaller in magnitude than the US (which has an estimated slope of 0.56) but comparable to France.

Therefore, Brazil has recently experienced great political turmoil and — consistently — an increase in affective polarization (even though there is less evidence of an increase in partisan or ideological polarization). Furthermore, Brazil’s affective polarization level is comparable to that of the US and Latin American countries but greater than some OECD countries. This polarization pattern can impact the formation of social ties among Brazilians of opposite ends of the political spectrum, which we will study in this paper. Moreover, while survey-based indicators of affective polarization can be informative, they have several limitations as they can be susceptible to intentional exaggeration (Iyengar et al., 2012). Our experiment contributes by studying polarization in a real-world setting, providing behavioral measures of affective polarization obtained in a natural environment.

2.2 Football

Football is by far the most popular sport in Brazil. 65% of the country’s population claim to be interested in this sport (Nielsen Sports, 2022). An even larger fraction of the population claims to support a football team: 73.1% of the Brazilian population (85.1% of men and 62.5% of women) support a football club (IPEC and O Globo, 2022).

The fact that a larger fraction of the Brazilian population claims to support a football club than to be interested in the sport suggests that football has a distinctive role in Brazilian society. Indeed, more than being a mere entertaining or recreational activity, football is a fundamental and constitutive element of Brazil’s national identity (Murad, 1995). Many anthropologists and sociologists have pointed out that a football club is an important element of an individual’s identity: DaMatta (1994) argues that, in the process of socialization in Brazil, there are “complex ties that entangle us to a football team (...), recreating in a modern level the idea of family as a community (...) that is chosen voluntarily” (see also DaMatta, 1982). This constitutive role of football in Brazilian society manifests itself not only in a positive way (e.g., by fostering a sense of community) but also negatively, as episodes of football-related violence are not uncommon in the country.⁹ Hence, a preferred football club is a relevant dimension of social identity in Brazil. This central role of football in identity is not exclusive to Brazil but is also common in many other Latin American countries (Alabarces, 2003).

Importantly, football in Brazil is characterized by teams with traditional rivalries (Ronconi, 2022). Those rivalries are usually constituted historically and create a sense of antagonism between clubs and, by extension, supporters of those clubs. Furthermore, most rivalries are between clubs from the same region of the country; for instance, some famous rivalries are those between Palmeiras and Corinthians (from the city of São Paulo) or between Flamengo and Vasco (from Rio de Janeiro).

⁹During the first semester of 2023, at least seven people were killed as a result of fights between football club supporters in Brazil (G1, 07-11-2023). Unexpected results in football matches in Brazil are also causally linked to episodes of domestic violence (Arabe, 2022).

A relevant feature of those rivalries is that the characteristics of club supporters are relatively uncorrelated with other societal divides such as income, gender, or political affiliation. Indeed, Appendix Figure B.1 shows that supporters of the six most popular Brazilian clubs and their rivals are mostly similar in terms of age, gender, race, education, income, and religion. Although there is some variation across some clubs, supporters are generally similar. Crucially, there is no case of a club whose supporters are associated almost exclusively with one characteristic. Moreover, all clubs we analyze have millions of supporters so that even “minorities” across some characteristics are numerous.

Therefore, no club is associated with the characteristic of the majority of its supporters. This feature is interesting as it suggests that socialization through football club preferences in Brazil has the potential of creating ties among individuals who would not generally share other identities. Finally, we also show that, in our sample of Twitter users (which we will describe in section 4), supporters of specific clubs are not disproportionately associated with a political affiliation (Appendix Table B.2). For nine out of the ten clubs we analyze, at least 38% of the supporters in our sample prefers the candidate preferred by the minority of that club’s supporters. Even for Corinthians, the club that has a more substantial majority of supporters with a political identity, the minority is still numerous: at least 27% of the club’s supporters in our sample prefer the minority candidate. Hence, the set of supporters of a given Brazilian football club is highly heterogeneous. This heterogeneity creates the opportunity for the formation of ties across income or partisan lines, which we will explore in this paper. Specifically, we ask if sharing a political club can generate social connections even when individuals have opposing political views.

2.3 Twitter

The setting of this experiment is Twitter, one of Brazil’s most popular social media platforms. In 2021, over 17 million Brazilians used Twitter (Statista, 2022b), making it one of the country’s most-used social media platforms. Twitter is a microblogging platform where users can share content in short posts (tweets) of at most 280 characters. On this platform, it is common to use hashtags — short expressions beginning with the symbol # — to signal a post’s topic. Through hashtags, it is easy for users to find others tweeting about their topics of interest. Users can also re-tweet or like posts from others, amplifying this content by making it visible to their followers.

On Twitter, most users have public profiles, which implies that their posts are publicly visible. Although it is also possible to have *protected* — i.e., private — accounts, the default configuration is for an account to be public. Each user with a public account has a profile page visible to all other users, including a profile picture, a background picture, and a short description (called *bio*) provided by the users. Moreover, the profile page shows the account’s history of tweets and usage metrics, such as the number of tweets, followers, and friends (the profiles the user follows).

Users can connect via follows, which do not need to be reciprocated, differently from other social media platforms such as Facebook. Indeed, to follow a public account, a user merely needs to click on “follow” on the account’s profile page. Right after the follow, the

user who has been followed receives a *follow notification* on their account, informing them that a new account has followed their profile.¹⁰ This notification shows the profile of who followed the user, and this user may decide to follow that account back, do nothing, or block it. Once someone follows another account, its new tweets, re-tweets, and likes may appear on this person’s *timeline* (Twitter’s main page). In contrast, users can also *block* others’ accounts if they do not want those accounts to be able to interact with them. When an account is blocked, it cannot follow the user who blocked it nor see its tweets. Importantly, the blocked account is not notified of the block, but if it visits the profile of an account that has blocked it, it can see that they were blocked.

Hence, we interpret follows and blocks as two opposite measures of the willingness to establish social ties with other accounts. On the one hand, following an account signals a desire to connect with that account (for instance, by seeing its posts or being able to send direct messages to it). On the other hand, blocks signal derogation or a desire to be as distant as possible (in the Twitter environment) from the account that is the object of the block. Indeed, a block is an active measure taken by an account, preventing any contact between that account and the blocked one.

A notable feature of Twitter in Brazil and other countries, such as the US, is that it plays an increasingly relevant role in shaping political discourse, particularly during campaign periods (Jungherr, 2016). This social media has been increasingly used both by candidates and the general public to comment and gather information about politics, in Brazil and elsewhere. Moreover, in countries such as the US, it has been shown that using Twitter had a causal effect on voter’s decisions during the 2016 and 2020 elections (Fujiwara et al., 2021). While such direct evidence does not exist for Brazil, some statistics suggest that this platform is indeed relevant to elections in the country. Using data from the 2019 Latin American Public Opinion Survey (LAPOP), we see that among Brazilians who used Twitter in 2018, 75% claimed to use the platform to see political information at least sometimes a year, a similar rate to that of Facebook (80%) and above that of WhatsApp, of 65% (LAPOP, 2019). These numbers are particularly relevant considering that, in the 2018 presidential elections, social media influenced the vote of 45% of Brazilians, according to a recent survey by DataSenado (DataSenado, 2019). Therefore, social media in general — and Twitter in particular — is increasingly relevant for politics worldwide and in Brazil specifically, making this platform an ideal setting for our experiment on political identity and the formation of social ties.

3 Conceptual Framework

In our experiment, individuals (Twitter users) who prefer a political candidate in the Brazilian presidential election and support a football club are followed on Twitter by a fictional

¹⁰Twitter sends this follow notification in most cases, but this does not always happen. In some cases, Twitter may consider that an account is acting suspiciously and *shadow-ban* it by making it invisible to other users. In this case, a followed user would not receive a follow notification. We describe how we deal with those cases in Section 4.

account with the same or different preferences as theirs. The individual must then decide how to interact with that account, either by following it back (thereby creating a social tie), ignoring it, or blocking it (demonstrating its desire to be as far apart as possible from that account in the social media environment).

We interpret these decisions in light of social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Identity — or a person’s “sense of self” as Akerlof and Kranton (2000) put it — represents the idea that, in many situations, people do not see themselves as independent individuals but rather as belonging to certain social groups, with a membership they value. This theory starts from the assumption that society encompasses several social categories (Tajfel, 1981) — such as “male”, “female”, “democrat”, “republican”, “supporter of football club X”, etc. These categories are constructed through historical, cultural, and sociological processes and can evolve or be relatively fluid (Kalin and Sambanis, 2018).

At different points in their lives, individuals may belong to some of these social groups. However, this does not imply that the individual identifies with all of those groups at all times. Indeed, an individual’s sense of self may change depending on situational cues or the salience of certain groups. For instance (adapting an example from Shayo (2020)), someone who is male, supports Brazilian football club Palmeiras, and intended to vote for Lula in the 2022 presidential election may identify as a man, as a Palmeiras supporter, as a Lula voter, as a combination of some or all of these categories, or even with none of the above depending on the context. Social identity may be an important determinant of networks, since those who identify with a particular group tend to evaluate in-group members positively while being relatively hostile towards the out-group (Tajfel, 1974, 1981). Therefore, given their identity, people may form social ties with those perceived as more similar to them, leading to homophily in social interactions (McPherson et al., 2001; Currarini et al., 2009).

We evaluate this hypothesis in our experiment by considering two dimensions of social identity: political and football club preference (which, as previously discussed, is often part of a person’s “sense of self” in the Brazilian context). Each one of these dimensions contains, in principle, several social categories: for instance, someone can be pro-Lula, pro-Bolsonaro, or favor another candidate or party (or none). In the experiment, we focus on subjects belonging either to the pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro social categories. Similarly, in the football dimension, a person’s social category is the club they support. Since we are interested exclusively in whether bot and subject share identities, we will focus on whether bot and subject share identities in each dimension (and not on how subjects belonging to specific social categories behave).

Throughout this paper, we call the football club dimension of identity “affective” identity. We do this in opposition to political identity as a way to highlight that political identity may overshadow other dimensions of identity in general, not just the one we analyse. Moreover, this terminology highlights that, historically, political preferences did not have such a significant “affective” content, as the literature on (political) affective polarization suggests (Iyengar et al., 2019). Indeed, this literature argues that people with opposing political identities increasingly consider their political preference as a core element of their social identity (Huddy et al., 2015; Van Bavel and Packer, 2021), leading them to evaluate positively those from the same political group while being relatively hostile towards the out-group. There-

fore, by using the term “affective identity” in opposition to political identity, we stress that the other dimensions of identity which we analyse — and which we show are overshadowed by political preference in a context of polarization — are dimensions within which people would traditionally socialize.

4 Experimental Design and Data

4.1 Experimental Design

We conducted our pre-registered experiment on Twitter between July and December 2022. We created fictional accounts (called ‘bot’ accounts) on Twitter that signaled their preferred candidate in the 2022 Brazilian election and/or their preferred Brazilian football club. The bot accounts randomly followed Twitter users who shared or not each identity (political and football club preference) with it. After five days active, we computed the number of follow-backs and blocks obtained by each bot. These are our two outcomes of interest in the experiment.

We ran the experiment on waves of five days each. On each wave, we activate three types of bots: (1) bots that signal both dimensions of identity (political and affective); (2) bots that only signal political identity; (3) bots that only signal affective (football-related) identity. Specifically, for each wave, we randomly chose two Brazilian football clubs (say, clubs A and B). We then created eight bots: pro-Lula, supporter of club A; pro-Bolsonaro, supporter of club A; pro-Lula, supporter of club B; pro-Bolsonaro, supporter of club B; supporter of club A (politically neutral); supporter of club B (politically neutral); pro-Lula (no club preference); pro-Bolsonaro (no club preference). The objective of creating bots that were neutral in one of the two identity dimensions is to evaluate the importance of each one of these two identities to the formation of ties, without having to condition on the other identity, as well as assessing the relative importance of each identity signal. We now give additional details on each aspect of the experimental design.

4.1.1 Bot Accounts

Table 1 describes the elements used in the accounts. Each account is characterized by its preference for a political candidate (Lula, Bolsonaro, or neutral), and by its preference for a football club (which can be one of the six Brazilian clubs with the largest number of supporters, or neutral).¹¹ The political and affective identity of each bot are chosen randomly, using a procedure that we describe in the following subsection.

¹¹The six clubs with the largest number of supporters in Brazil are C.R. Flamengo, S.C. Corinthians Paulista, São Paulo F.C., S.E. Palmeiras, Grêmio F.B.P.A. and C.R. Vasco da Gama. The ranking of club supporters comes from a 2022 survey by Sport Track and XP (Sport Track and XP, 2022). While the bots only support one of these six teams, the subject pool includes individuals who support rivals of these teams — specifically, apart from the six teams listed, we include subjects who support S.C. Internacional (Grêmio’s rival), Botafogo F.R. and Fluminense F.C. (Flamengo and Vasco’s rivals), and Santos F.C. (Palmeiras, São Paulo and Corinthians’ rival).

Given an assigned political and affective identity, we can describe how these are signaled in the bot’s profile. We signal political identity by including, in the bot’s bio, either the hashtag *#Lula2022* or *#Bolsonaro2022*, and by re-tweeting one post from the candidate supported by the bot.¹² If the bot is politically neutral, we simply do not include either hashtag and do not retweet a political post. On the other hand, we signal affective identity through the bot’s profile picture (which is a picture of a flag with the bot’s preferred team logo in a stadium) and by adding the text “Supporter of team X” in the bot’s bio. For bots that are neutral in the football-related dimension, we use a photo of a football stadium outside Brazil (and for which it is not possible to identify the teams) instead of a specific team’s logo as the profile pic, and include the text “Football fan” in the bio. Therefore, the accounts that are football team-neutral are still signalling that they are interested in football (the only difference is that they do not signal preference for a specific team). Figure 2 shows examples of bot accounts.

Therefore, for the accounts that signal both dimensions of identity, the affective identity — preferred football club — is more salient than political identity (which is signaled exclusively on the bot’s bio). Nevertheless, we also created, in three experimental waves, extra accounts that signaled their political preference more saliently. Examples of such accounts can be seen in Appendix Figure B.3. In the case of these accounts, the profile picture is the official campaign photo of their preferred candidate. Thus, affective identity is only signaled on the account’s bio. We created these accounts with the objective of testing how subjects’ behavior changes in a more extreme case, where political preference is more salient.

4.1.2 Sample Selection and Assignment into Treatment

The most important feature of our sample is that we must be able to identify the political identity (either pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro) and the preferred football team of each subject. Appendix Figure A.2 represents schematically the procedure used to obtain the subject sample. First, we use Twitter’s API to obtain a sample of users who either tweeted or re-tweet a status containing pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro hashtags between May 31st and July 11th, 2022. The list of hashtags we considered is displayed in Appendix Table A.1. Hence, our sample is composed of politically engaged individuals, who were already actively discussing politics a couple of months before the election and the official campaign period (which started on August 16th). Then, we inspected if the user’s Twitter bio (the short description that the user writes in their profile) signalled the user’s preferred Brazilian football club. To do this, we first use a simple algorithm that detects terms associated with the 6 most popular Brazilian football clubs and their rivals in the bios, and then manually check if the matches are correct. We then remove accounts that were created in 2022 (that are more likely to be inauthentic), accounts that are clearly bots, accounts with less than 10 followers and accounts with a ratio of followers to friends above 20. The objective of doing this is to remove accounts that are very unlikely to follow-back the experimental accounts, and accounts that are not

¹²To alleviate concerns that the bots may be amplifying political content, we only re-tweet posts that already have more than 500 re-tweets and that do not include misleading information or hate speech, as agreed with our Institutional Review Board.

authentic.¹³ After these procedures, we are left with a sample of 4,652 individual accounts. We note that, due to query restrictions of Twitter’s API, this is only a sample of the Brazilian accounts that signal political and football club preferences on Twitter.

We obtained a set of variables for each subject using Twitter’s API. Specifically, we have information on the number of tweets, followers, and friends. We also have information on location for the accounts that choose to let this information public, which we recode to a regional level. Moreover, we know whether the account is verified, the number of likes (“favorites”) it performed, and its date of creation. From users’ names, we predicted their gender using information from the Brazilian Census (tabulated by [Meireles, 2021](#)). Appendix Tables [B.1](#) and [B.2](#) present descriptive statistics of subjects. First, we see that our sample is balanced across Bolsonaro and Lula supporters (45 and 55%, approximately). We also show that, for all football clubs we consider, there is a significant group that supports each of the two political candidates. In some cases, the distribution is skewed towards one candidate, but there is always at least 25% of users who support each candidate. This is consistent with the observation that, in Brazil, football clubs are not specifically associated with political preferences, and that the set of supporters of every mass club is heterogeneous.

In each experimental wave, we activated eight bot accounts: four accounts that signal both their preferred football team and their political preference; and four accounts that are neutral in one of the two dimensions (i.e., two accounts that are “football fans”, but do not signal a specific team; and two accounts that signal a specific team, but not a political identity). In each wave, we randomly choose two football clubs for the bot accounts.¹⁴ Then, within a wave, three bots signaled a preference for each of these two teams.

Each bot then follows approximately 100 subjects during each wave. Following the suggestion of [Athey and Imbens \(2017\)](#), we perform block-randomization to define the treatment assignment. Specifically, the treatment assignment to each bot is done by stratifying the subjects in terms of their political identity, preferred football team and whether the subjects’ number of followers is above or below the median. First, for the bots who signal their preferred football club, we restrict the sample of subjects to the ones who either support the same team as the bot, or who support a rival team. We only consider regional (intra-state) rivalries; the list of rivalries is described in Appendix Table [A.2](#). Given that we are interested in studying the effect of matching bot and subjects’ identities on follow-backs and blocks, we have four strata in terms of bot-subjects identity pairs (congruence in both dimensions, incongruence in both dimensions, or congruence in a single dimension), and each pair is further divided into two smaller strata (above or below the median number of followers). We

¹³Before the experiment, as pre-registered, we simply inspected manually to identify automated (“bot”) accounts and removed them from the subject pool. After running the experiment, we also used the *Botometer* API to estimate the probability that each of our potential subjects were an automated account. This API uses several publicly available information from Twitter accounts to estimate a probability that the account is automated (for details, see [Sayyadiharikandeh et al., 2020](#); [Yang et al., 2020](#)). Reassuringly, we only excluded from the final subject pool accounts with a Botometer score above 0.85. However, we did miss 39 accounts with more than 85% chance of being automated (less than 1% of our final sample). The median Botometer score of the subject is 0.13. In Section [5.4](#), we show that our results are identical for a sub-sample of subjects that are unlikely bots according to the Botometer classification.

¹⁴Throughout the experiment, we randomly sample teams with a probability equal to the proportion of each team’s supporters in our sample.

sample the same proportion of subjects from each stratum. Each subject may be treated (i.e., followed by a bot) more than once, but never in subsequent waves: after being treated in a wave, a subject only returns to the subject pool after 3 waves. Hence, concerns about subjects “learning” about the experiment are alleviated.

Therefore, the “treatment” in our experiment is to receive a follow notification from one of the experimental accounts on Twitter. The experimental variation comes from whether subject and bot agree or disagree in their political and/or affective dimension of identity. Figure 3 illustrates such notification. The way a user sees the notification depends on whether he or she is using Twitter from the mobile application or a desktop computer.¹⁵ In both cases, the user immediately sees the bot’s photo. In the mobile app, he or she also sees the description (which indicates the political affiliation). The user only sees the description on a computer when they click (or hover the mouse’s cursor) over the profile. However, to follow back or block the account, every desktop user will inevitably need to either click on the profile or hover the mouse’s cursor over it, thus seeing the bot’s description and, therefore, its political affiliation.

Apart from following the experimentally assigned accounts, each bot account also followed one account from someone who is aware about the experiment. This person then informed us whether they received a notification of the follow. The objective of doing so is to guarantee that the follow is being notified to the users.¹⁶ If an account is shadow-banned, we simply drop it from the analysis, as determined in our pre-analysis plan. Over the entire experiment, we had 12 shadow-banned accounts (5.1% of the accounts we created). Shadow-banning was not correlated with the bot’s political identity (specifically, out of the 12 shadow-banned accounts, 3 were pro-Lula, 4 pro-Bolsonaro, and 5 were politically neutral).

4.1.3 Timing

As described in the previous section, the experiment was run in waves. In each wave, 8 bots were activated: 4 signaling both their political identity and football club preference, and 4 neutral in one of the two dimensions of social identity. Within each wave, we used the following timeline:

- (i) **Day 0:** Creation of accounts according to the procedures described in Table 1. The account re-tweets a post related to its sportive identity (either a post from its preferred club official account — if the bot has a preferred club — or a general post about football that does not favor any club), and then a post from its preferred political candidate. The bot accounts also follow a set of 15 “elite” accounts related to their interest (for

¹⁵Overall, 80% of Twitter users access the platform via their mobile device (Statista, 2022a). In our sample, by live-streaming tweets using Twitter API during the experimental period, we find that 72% of subjects exclusively tweeted and re-tweeted through the Mobile App.

¹⁶On Twitter, a concern we have is with the so-called “shadow-ban”. This is a type of punishment Twitter may deploy against users whose behavior on the platform seems suspicious. In practice, what happens is that all activity from a shadow-banned user is “hidden” to other users, including notifications of follows. Therefore, we guarantee that no bot account is shadow-banned before using the results from any experimental wave.

instance, the official account of their preferred candidate and club), and is followed by a set of five colleagues who were aware of the experiment.

- (ii) **Day 1:** Each bot account follows the subjects assigned to it according to the procedure described in the previous section.
- (iii) **Day 5:** After five days active, we compute the number of followers and blocks for each account and delete all information in the account, rebooting it to be used in the next wave.

We started one wave every Tuesday and every Friday, which means that we had two overlapping waves at each moment. The specific timeline is displayed in Appendix Figure A.1. We ran 43 experimental waves between July and December 2022. This period is particularly interesting because the Brazilian presidential election of 2022 was held during the second semester of 2022 (specifically, the first round happened on October 3rd and the second round on October 29th). We use the differential timing of the experimental waves to study the heterogeneous effect of shared identity on the formation of social ties when political identity is more or less salient.

On each wave, we compute follow-backs once a day using Twitter’s API. In our main analysis, we will use the final follow-back measure, computed on the fifth day since the bot followed the subjects. On the other hand, we only compute blocks at the end of each wave (i.e., on the fifth day). This happens because Twitter’s API does not allow us to directly compute blocks. The procedure we use to compute blocks is as follows: first, we use Twitter’s API to obtain, for each bot account, the set of accounts followed by it. We then compare this set with the set of accounts assigned to be followed by the bot. The difference between the two sets can be due to three mutually exclusive reasons: (i) the bot was indeed blocked by a subject; (ii) the subject was suspended or deactivated their account; (iii) the subject removed the bot from its followers. To assess which one of the three happened for each subject in this difference set, we manually enter these subjects’ profiles from the bot’s Twitter account. From the profiles, we can easily see which of the three cases happened. We only classify the subject as having blocked the bot if we see, on the fifth day, a block using this procedure.¹⁷

4.2 Empirical Strategy

We are interested in studying the effect of identity congruence in the formation of social ties on Twitter. In most of our analysis, we present results pooling all experimental waves, comparing the follow-back and block rates of subjects who shared or not political and/or affective identity with the bot.

To formally test the significance of our results, we use the following pre-registered specifications, that include wave and strata fixed effects. First, we focus on the experimental

¹⁷A fourth possibility is that a subject blocked a bot, but then unblocked it. We do not treat this as a block but as a follower removal. Thus, in our measure of blocks, there are only subjects that blocked a subject and kept it this way until the end of the wave.

accounts that signal a single dimension of identity (either political or affective). As described previously, these accounts follow subjects with whom they agree or disagree in this dimension. Our outcomes of interest (follow-backs and blocks) measure how subjects interact with the bots in response to being followed by them. Thus, we restrict our analysis to the experimentally assigned pairs subjects-bots. We denote our outcome of interest by Y_{ijst} , which is an indicator equal to one if subject i from strata s interacted with bot j during wave t . Here, “interacted” can either represent a follow-back or a block. We then estimate an equation of the form:

$$Y_{ijst} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times \text{identity_congruence}_{ij} + X_{ijt}\lambda + \delta_t + \theta_s + \phi_{st} + \varepsilon_{ijst} \quad (1)$$

where $\text{identity_congruence}_{ij}$ is an indicator equal to one if bot and subject share identity (in the dimension we are studying), δ_t , θ_s and ϕ_{st} represent, respectively, wave, strata and strata \times wave fixed effects and ε_{ijst} is the error term. X_{ijt} is a vector of control variables from the bot, subjects and waves (interacted with the treatment dummies).¹⁸ Specifically, we include in this vector the number of followers and tweets from the subject; the year he or she created the account; the subject’s gender and location; and the google trend index of bot’s j football club at wave t (which is included, interacted with the identity congruence indicator, in the case of bots that signal their preferred football club). The purpose of controlling for this trend is to control for the salience of the football-related identity across waves.

Apart from studying the treatment arms with accounts that signal a single dimension of identity, we also study the accounts that signal both dimensions. In this case, there are four possible pairs of subjects and bots (congruent in both dimensions, congruent either on affective or political identity, but incongruent in the other dimension, and incongruent in both). To study these treatment arms, we estimate the following equation:

$$Y_{ijst} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times \text{political_congruence}_{ij} + \beta_2 \times \text{affective_congruence}_{ij} + \beta_3 \times \text{political_congruence}_{ij} \times \text{affective_congruence}_{ij} + X_{ijt}\lambda + \delta_t + \theta_s + \phi_{st} + \varepsilon_{ijst} \quad (2)$$

where $\text{political_congruence}_{ij}$ is an indicator equal to one if bot j and subject i share political preferences, $\text{affective_congruence}_{ij}$ equals one if bot j and subject i share preference for football club, and the other variables have the same definition as before. Importantly, we control by the bot’s football club salience by including, in the vector of controls, the google trends index of the bot during each wave (interacted with the treatment indicators).

Since our outcome is an indicator variable, Equation (2) represents a linear probability model. Coefficient β_1 can be interpreted as the effect (in percentage points) in follow-backs or blocks of sharing political identity for subjects who do not share affective identity with the bot. Similarly, β_2 is the effect of sharing affective identity for subjects who do not share political identity with the bot. Finally, β_3 can be interpreted as the difference in the effect of sharing affective identity between subjects who share or not political identity with the bot.

¹⁸We include strata fixed effects following the suggestion from [Bruhn and McKenzie \(2009\)](#). We also include strata \times wave fixed effects to account for possible differences in the behavior of subjects from different strata at different moments in time. Moreover, note that, among the strata fixed effects, there will be a misfits dummy.

We present standard errors clustered at the bot-account level. We performed the simplest assessment proposed by [Ferman \(2022\)](#) to verify if our inference method is reliable, given the number of clusters. We simulate our data under the null hypothesis of no treatment effects, using Bernoulli draws with parameter equal to the average follow-back rate in the pilot. Reassuringly, we obtained a rate of rejection of the null under a nominal significance level of 5% that was very close to 5% in all cases.

4.3 Balance and Attrition

Appendix Tables [B.3](#) presents summary statistics of treated subjects across all eight treatment arms. In all cases, pre-treatment subject characteristics are balanced across treatments: for all pre-treatment variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality across all treatment arms for standard significance levels (we perform a joint test of equality and report its F-statistic in the last column of the table).

The table also shows attrition rates for each treatment arm. In this experiment, we consider that a subject suffered attrition if it was assigned to be treated, but we were unable to treat it. This could happen for three reasons: the subject’s account was suspended (a punishment inflicted by Twitter when the account’s use violates the platform’s policy); the subject deactivated their account; or the subject made its account private. In the first two cases, we would be unable to find the account on Twitter. In the third case, we could find the account but did not follow it as agreed with our IRB.

Overall, there was no differential attrition in the experiment. For all treatment arms, the attrition rate was close to 9%, and characteristics of attrited subjects are not different across treatment arms, as can be seen in [Table B.4](#) in the Appendix. Therefore, when analyzing “statical” results, by pooling results of different waves and estimating Equation (1) or (2), attrition will not be a concern. Indeed, since we include wave fixed effects and attrition is observed at the beginning of each wave, we always compare statistically similar accounts when doing this type of “statical” specification.

5 Experimental Results

5.1 Effects of Political or Affective Congruence on the Formation of Ties

We start by examining whether sharing each identity — affective or political — impacts the formation of social ties on Twitter for our sample of politically engaged individuals. To do that, we restrict our analysis to the experimental accounts that signal a single dimension of identity.

We first show that football clubs are indeed a relevant dimension of socialization in our setting. Results for the experiment using the politically neutral accounts (i.e., the accounts that only signaled preferred football club) are displayed in [Figure 4](#). Our figures follow a

similar pattern: each figure displays results for follow-backs (top panel) and blocks (lower panel). For each of these two outcomes, we plot on the left-hand side the average rate of the outcome across the entire experimental period for pairs of subjects and bot that are congruent or incongruent in the dimension of identity analyzed, by simply pooling results from all experimental waves. Finally, the right-hand side plot shows coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals for an indicator of congruence between bot and subject in the relevant identity dimension, using our pre-registered specification with strata and wave fixed-effects, and with or without additional controls (the list of controls is in Section 4.2).

Figure 4 shows that individuals in our sample are more likely to establish ties with experimental accounts that support the same football club as them rather than their rivals. Indeed, a subject has a 36.3% chance of reciprocating a follow from a bot supporting their team, against a 22.9% chance of reciprocating a follow from a supporter of a rival team. The difference, of 13.4 percentage points, is highly significant and meaningful (a subject is more than 50% more likely to follow a bot from the same group than from the out-group in this affective dimension). The results for blocks tell a similar story, even though the block rate of politically-neutral accounts is low. Subjects block 2.3% of rival accounts, against only 0.9% of accounts with a shared preference. This difference is again highly significant, but quantitatively small since the baseline rate of blocks is very low in this case.

Therefore, football club preferences are a relevant determinant of the formation of social ties in our setting. Using our pre-registered specification, we estimate that shared identity in this dimensions causes an increase in the probability of follow backs of approximately 14.1 pp, and a decrease in the probability of blocks of 1.3 pp, both significant at the 1% level. This result provides quantitative evidence in favor of the observation, made by several sociologists and anthropologists, that football club preferences are a relevant dimension of socialization in Brazil (e.g., Murad, 1995; DaMatta, 1982).

Nevertheless, while football seems to be a relevant determinant of socialization, we find that political identity plays a greater role in the formation of social ties, particularly when it comes to avoiding contact with the out-group. Figure 5 shows the effect of shared political identity on the formation of ties, considering the accounts that only signal political preference. Recall that, even though these experimental accounts are neutral in terms of football club preference, they still signal interest in football. We find that sharing political identity causes an increase in the probability of follow-back of 20 pp (from 16.8% to 36.8%), and a decrease in the probability of blocks of approximately 12 pp (from 0.7% to 13%). Therefore, the effect of shared political identity was greater than the effect of shared affective identity, even though the bots signaled more saliently their preferred football club (in their profile picture and bio) than their political preference (only in their bio).

5.2 The Interplay between Political and Affective Congruence

So far, we only discussed the results for the accounts that signal either political or affective identity, exclusively. However, analyzing results for the experimental accounts that signal both dimensions of identity allows us to study their interplay on the formation of social ties.

Results for this analysis are displayed in Figure 6. The top panel of this figure shows the average follow-back rate, while the bottom panel shows the average block rate, for all eight treatment arms (the four arms with bots signaling both identities and the four arms with bots signaling a single dimension). These treatment arms are all represented at the same time in the two plots. In the x -axis, we represent whether bot and subjects share political identity: the left-most three columns show cases in which bot and subject disagree politically, while the right-most show cases in which they agree. Moreover, the two bars in the center represent the two cases in which political identity is not signaled, and therefore the only dimension of interest is the affective (these are the same results as Figure 4). Finally, the *bar colors* indicate the relationship between subject and bot’s football club preference. As in the case of political identity, there are three possibilities: either bot and subject share football club preference, support rival clubs, or the bot does not signal its preferred club (in that case, it only signals political preferences and the results, in grey, are the same as in Figure 5).¹⁹

The figures reveal that sharing either dimension of identity significantly increases the probability of follow-backs and decreases the probability of blocks. However, the magnitude of these effects are different once we condition on the other dimension of identity. We discuss these differences, and potential interpretations, in what follows, dividing the analysis in four main findings: first, while congruence in both identities have a positive effect on ties, the effective of political identity is greater; second, conditioning on football club preference does not change much the effect of political identity, which remains large; in contrast, by conditioning on information about bot’s political identity, the effect of affective identity becomes smaller; yet, there is still a significant effect of sharing football club preference, suggesting that, even in a polarized setting, sharing identities such as preference for a football club may help reduce political divides.

5.2.1 The exchange rate between shared political and affective identities

Overall, consistent with our findings in the previous section, we find that both congruence in political identity and in affective identity have a positive effect on follow-backs and a negative effect on blocks. When it comes to follow-backs, the subjects who are least likely to reciprocate a bot’s follow are those who do not share neither a political identity nor a preferred football club with the bot. In this case, there is only a 16% chance of follow-back. For blocks, the result is qualitatively similar, since those most likely to block a bot are subjects who do not share either dimension of identity with it (14.6% chance of blocking). By sharing either dimension of identity, there is an increase in the follow-back probability and a decrease in the blocking probability. However, the effect of sharing political identity is substantially larger than the effect of sharing affective identity.

An interesting way of visualizing this effect is by considering the exchange rate between

¹⁹Apart from the graphical results shown in Figure 6, Appendix Tables B.6 and B.7 report tests of difference in means, with standard errors clustered at the bot account level, for follow-backs and blocks (respectively) for each pair of treatment arms. For simplicity of exposure, we focus on discussing the results as shown in Figure 6, and report hypothesis test results in the text when relevant.

shared political and affective identities implied by the experiment’s results. Consider someone who follows a subject with whom they disagree in both dimensions of identities (and, therefore, has a 16% chance of being followed-back by it). In this case, by sharing political identity (but not affective), the follow-back probability would increase to 32.4% (an increase of 16.4 pp relative to the case of disagreement in both dimensions). However, by sharing affective identity only (but not political) this probability would increase to 20.3% (an increase of 4.3 pp relative to the case of disagreement in both dimensions). Therefore, the increase in the probability of having a follow reciprocated, relative to the case of following someone who disagrees with a bot in both identity dimensions, is roughly four times larger if the bot follows someone who shares political identity but supports a rival club than if it follows someone who supports the same club, but has an opposite political preference. Hence, political identity is significantly more relevant to the formation of social ties than football club in our setting, despite the political identity being signaled less saliently than the affective identity.

5.2.2 Effect of political congruence conditional on congruence in affective identity

We now analyze the effects of congruence in political identity conditional on congruence (or lack there-off) in affective identity. In the previous section, we found that, when information about football club preferences was not available, subjects were 20 pp more likely to follow-back bots with whom they shared political preferences (compared to bots who preferred the opposite candidate). When both dimensions of identity are signaled by the bots, the effect of congruence in political identity remains quantitatively similar in the case of follow-backs.

First, among subject-bot pairs who support the same football club (blue bars in Figure 6), the likelihood of follow-backs is of 20.3% when bot and subject disagree politically, against 40.8% when they agree. The difference, of 20.5 percentage points, is highly statistically significant (p -value < 0.001). Similarly, among bot-subject pairs who support rival clubs (red bars), the follow-back probability is of 16% for subjects and bots who disagree politically, and of 32.4% for subjects and bot who agree in this dimension. The difference, of 16.4 pp (also significant at the 1% level), is relatively smaller than the difference in the case in which football club is not informed by the bot, but is still substantial. In all cases, sharing political identity roughly doubles the probability of follow-back.

Similarly, the effect of political identity on blocks is substantial independently of information about bot’s preferred club. When this information is unavailable, the probability of blocking a bot is 12.3 pp smaller when bot and subject share political identity compared to when they have opposite identities in this dimension. When bot and subjects support rival football clubs, this difference is of 13.5 pp (from 1.1% chance of blocking when the two politically agree to 14.6% when they disagree). Finally, when bot and subject support the same club, the difference is relatively smaller, but still large: 7.9 pp (from 0.6% chance of blocking when the two politically agree to 8.5% when they disagree). While it is true that when bot and subject support the same club there is a significant reduction in the blocking probability — which we will further discuss later — it is noticeable that the difference is sizeable even

in this case. Indeed, as Figure 6b shows, blocking happens almost exclusively against politically opposite accounts. Therefore, we find that individuals who disagree politically have a tendency to avoid each other (through blocks).

Overall, the effect of sharing political identity is large regardless of whether bot and subject support the same or rival clubs, or if there is no information on bot’s football club preference. We interpret this as evidence that the effect of political identity on follow-backs is not offset significantly (nor reinforced) by information on affective identity.

5.2.3 Effect of affective congruence conditional on political identity

The same cannot be said of the effect of sharing affective identity conditional on information on bot’s political identity. When bots do not signal their political identity, we saw that the effect of sharing a football club was to increase the probability of follow-backs by 13.4 pp. This effect is smaller both when bot and subject agree or disagree politically. First, conditional on congruence in the political identity (right-most bars), the probability of follow-back when bot and subject support rival clubs is of 32.4%, against 40.8% when they support the same one, a difference of 8.4 pp (significant at the 1% level). This effect of sharing affective identity conditional on agreeing politically is significantly smaller than the effect of sharing affective identity when no information about political preferences is given by the bots. This difference is also quantitatively meaningful, as it implies a reduction of almost 40% in the effect of affective congruence.

The reduction in the effect of affective identity is even more striking when we consider bot-subject pairs that disagree politically. In this case, sharing a football club raises by 4.3 pp the probability of follow-backs (from a baseline of 16%), which is significantly less than the effect when bot’s political identity was not informed. This represents a reduction of approximately 68% in the effect of sharing affective identity, relative to this effect when bots did not signal their political identity.

Hence, during the period we analysed, political identity overshadowed other dimensions of identity (namely, football club preference) in the formation of social ties. Indeed, information on bot’s political identity offsets the effect of shared affective identity, particularly among politically-opposite individuals, undermining social ties that could be formed if the bot did not signal their political identity. This is evidence that, at least in contexts of high polarization — such as the one we analyse — political preferences can reduce the potential of other shared identities to foster connections among individuals and cause the destruction of social ties that would otherwise be formed, leading to a less integrated society.

5.2.4 Congruence in affective identity and the formation of social ties

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that, even though political divergence makes the effects of shared affective identity substantially smaller, this dimension of identity is still able to create ties among politically opposite individuals. Indeed, among politically-opposite individuals, sharing football club preference increases the probability of follow-backs by 4.3

percentage points relative to subject-bot pairs supporting rival clubs (the effect is significant at the 1% level). Perhaps more surprisingly, shared football identity also increases the probability of follow-back among politically-opposite individuals relative to the case in which bots do not signal their preferred club. In this case, the effect is somewhat smaller (of 3.5 pp), but is still significant at the 1% level. Therefore, even among politically-opposite individuals, shared football club fostered ties.

For blocks, the effect is even larger. Among politically-opposite individuals, sharing affective identity reduces the blocking probability by 6.1 pp relative to the case of rival clubs. This represents a substantial reduction of 42% in the likelihood of blocking. Sharing a club also reduces the blocking probability among politically-opposite individuals relative to the case in which football club information is not given, by 4.5 pp. Both differences are significant at the 1% level. Hence, sharing affective identity significantly reduces the probability of blocks — even if this probability remains relatively large.

Therefore, despite indicating that political identity overshadows affective identity in the formation of ties, our results also suggest that, even in a context of intense polarization and among politically-engaged individuals, sharing a dimension of identity such as football club can foster ties and reduce avoidance among politically-opposite individuals. This result is consistent with the evidence that football can foster social cohesion (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020; Ronconi, 2022). Hence, our findings indicate that highlighting a shared common interest — in this case, preference for football club — can help reduce politically-induced societal divides. This result is also consistent with studies on interventions aimed at reducing affective polarization, particularly cross-partisan conversations (i.e., conversations between supporters of opposite parties). Santoro and Brockman (2022) show that the effectiveness of such conversations is conditional on the conversation’s topic. Our experiment suggests that highlighting shared identities may be effective in this type of intervention, even though the effect may be small in a polarized context.

Overall, our results suggest that both dimensions of identity are relevant to the formation of social ties, but that political identity has a significantly larger role than the affective dimension, at least in our sample of subjects. Comparing the results for the accounts signaling both or a single dimension, we find that political identity overshadows affective identity, reducing the importance of sharing a preference for football club on the decision to follow-back an account or not. Nevertheless, even when political identity is signaled, congruence in affective identity is capable of generating social ties. This is surprising, particularly considering that our sample of subject is composed of politically engaged individuals (who were using political hashtags at least three months before the election). The fact that congruence in affective identity plays a role even in this context is suggestive of the fact that similarities in dimensions relatively uncorrelated with politics can reduce political divides.

5.3 Bots with more salient political identity

The results discussed so far focused on accounts that signaled political identity only in their bio. One caveat in the interpretation of these results is that the bot accounts we constructed signal more saliently their affective identity (the football club’s symbol is on their profile

picture) than their political identity. What would results look like if the salience of those signals in the bot accounts were inverted?

To answer this question, we created, during a few experimental waves, another treatment arm with bots signaling political identity more saliently.²⁰ As discussed in the experimental design section, instead of having the football club’s symbol in their profile picture, these bots had the official campaign photo of their preferred candidate as their profile picture, only signaling affective identity in their bio (examples of these accounts can be seen in Appendix Figure B.3). Considering accounts constructed in this way is relevant as it allow us to consider a more extreme case, in which the bot highlights its political affiliation. Interestingly, we find that even when bots signal political identity more saliently, affective identity plays a role in the formation of ties, particularly when it comes to avoiding blocks.

Figure 7 shows results for this extra treatment arm, while Appendix Figure B.4 shows similar results for the accounts in the main experiment, restricting the analysis to the waves in which we also conducted the extra experiment. We find that, when bots signal political identity more saliently, congruence in political identity becomes more relevant to the formation of ties. Indeed, the effect of sharing political identity on follow-backs is roughly twice as large when political identity is more salient than in the standard case. Yet, congruence in affective identity remains having a role on the formation of ties. For follow-backs, this effect is positive and statistically significant among politically congruent individuals. More importantly, for blocks, we see that the likelihood of blocks when subjects do not share either identity is of 25.9%, against only 18.1% when subjects share affective identity (but not political). This effect — of 7.8 percentage points — is comparable to the effect of congruence in affective identity in the main experiment, where political identity is signaled less saliently by the bots. Therefore, affective congruence still plays a role even when political identity is signalled with higher salience by the bots.

Overall, the result of this extra experiment reinforces our main result: both identities continue to have an impact on the formation of social ties. Importantly, even when political identity is signaled very saliently, sharing preference for a football club has a positive impact on ties, particularly by reducing the probability of blocks. This suggests that the potential positive effect of shared affective identity does not hinge on the degree on which this identity is highlighted.

5.4 Robustness and Validity

In this section, we report some robustness tests and results of additional exercises that may provide further validity to the results and interpretations discussed so far. One relevant concern, particularly when comparing the results of the experiment across time, is that the pool of subjects may change over time due to attrition or reduction in Twitter activity. To address these issues, we repeat our analysis for different sub-samples of subjects, discussed in what follows.

²⁰This extra experiment was not pre-registered, and was conducted as a way of evaluating the robustness of the previous (pre-registered) analysis.

5.4.1 Attrition and Activity

First, following our pre-analysis plan, we repeat our analysis for a sample of subjects that never suffered attrition. Results of the analysis are displayed in Column (4) of Appendix Table B.8, for the case of bots that signal both dimensions of identity. Similar analyses are reported in Appendix Table B.9 for the treatment arms with accounts signaling a single dimension of identity. We estimate Equation (2) for the sample of subjects that did not suffer attrition at any point in the experiment. As expected given the discussion in Section 4.3, results are remarkably similar to the main results (reported in the third column of Appendix Table B.8).

However, suffering attrition is not the only way an account may, in practice, “leave” the experiment. It is possible that individuals who used Twitter frequently at the beginning of the experiment become less active on the platform over time, leading to a fall in experimental take-up (and, potentially, a change in the characteristics of the pool of effectively treated subjects). Indeed, Figure B.2 in the Appendix shows that, for our entire pool of subjects, there is a fall in take-up (both in terms of follow-backs and of blocks) over time. To address this concern, we create two indicators of Twitter activity, using information on the exact date of tweets and re-tweets (the only type of activity we observe directly). First, we create a wave-specific indicator, equal to one if subjects that were assigned to treatment on that wave had tweeted or re-tweeted a status on the 24 hours before treatment. Considering only those subjects, we see that take-up is fairly constant (second panel of Appendix Figure B.2), suggesting that the fall in take-up is driven by a fall in Twitter activity. We also create a second measure of activity at the subject level, equal to one if the subject tweeted in all weeks the experiment was running. This second measure is important for the dynamic analysis, as the type of subjects who are active in each wave may change. For both sub-samples of active users (active every week and active the day before treatment), Appendix Table B.8 show that results for our main static analysis are also unchanged (columns (5) and (6), respectively).

5.4.2 Effect of Specific Clubs

Another potential concern with our results could be that the specific football clubs we used signal other characteristics, changing subjects’ decisions not because of congruence in football club preference but because some other characteristic signaled by a club preference is valued (or not) by them. To show that this is not the case, we repeat our analysis excluding one bot club (and its rivals) at a time. This analysis, displayed in Appendix Table B.10, shows that results are not driven by specific clubs, since the point-estimates of the effect of sharing identities are stable for all sub-samples.

Moreover, some of the subjects in the experiment support football clubs that were not signaled by any bot throughout the experiment. This may be a concern since those subjects can only be assigned to be followed by a bot supporting a rival club, i.e., they can only be from the out-group in the affective dimension. We repeat our analysis excluding those subjects. Reassuringly, results are qualitatively similar and almost identical numerically to the main analysis, as reported in Appendix Table B.11.

5.4.3 Automated Accounts

Finally, some concerns may arise related to the existence of automated accounts (or “bots”) on Twitter. First, a potential concern is that part of our subject pool is composed of automated accounts. Following our pre-analysis plan, we manually excluded from the potential subject pool accounts that seemed likely to be bots before conducting the experiment. However, after the experiment, we also used the *Botometer* API to obtain an estimate of the probability that each of our subjects was an automated account.²¹ Reassuringly, the median score in our final sample was 0.13 (i.e., the API classifies the account as having a 13% chance of being automated), and only 39 accounts — less than 1% — had a score above 0.85 (in our manually classification, we did not remove any account with a score lower than 0.85). The final columns of Appendix Tables B.8 and B.9 display results for a subsample of subjects with below median *Botometer* score, i.e., for subjects whose accounts are extremely unlikely to be automated. The results are almost identical to the results for the main sample. Moreover, estimates are stable for other (both more and less conservative) *Botometer* scores thresholds.

A related concern is that some subjects may perceive the experimental accounts as inauthentic. Overall, given the high take-up of the experiment, it is clear that many users considered the accounts realistic. Nevertheless, the interpretation of our results could be challenged if users perceived accounts that did not share their political identity as more likely to be bots than accounts that shared their political identity. While we cannot directly assess this type of perception, we provide some indirect evidence suggesting that this was not the case. Specifically, we use a Bayesian Classifier algorithm to classify whether the subject’s most recent tweets before being followed by an experimental account had political content or not. Compared to a subject that tweeted about politics, a subject that tweeted about some other topic may expect to receive follows from other users who do not share their political identity with higher probability. In that sense, we consider that subjects that had just tweeted about a topic other than politics may be less suspicious when receiving a follow from someone identifying with the opposite political group, i.e., they may have less reason to (differentially) believe that an experimental account with opposite political identity is inauthentic. Hence, if the follow-back and blocking behavior of users who just tweeted about politics and who just tweeted about other topics is similar, we would have indirect evidence that suspicions about the experimental account’s lack of authenticity are not driving our results.

Appendix Figure B.5 reports the results for this heterogeneity analysis. Due to data constraints, we only report results starting at wave 11 (the first one for which we collected the subject’s most recent tweet before treatment). Appendix Figure B.6 reports the full sample results for this specific time frame. In all cases, we restrict the analysis to accounts that had tweeted in the seven days before treatment. Reassuringly, we find that the behavior of subjects that had just tweeted something political is remarkably similar to the behavior of subjects that tweeted something about another topic (and, more generally, to the overall behavior we documented in the main analysis). We also perform a similar heterogeneity

²¹For details on *Botometer*’s algorithm, see [Sayyadiharikandeh et al. \(2020\)](#) and [Yang et al. \(2020\)](#).

analysis by classifying users’ bios (the short profile description) according to their political content or not. In this case, we simply search for keywords associated with politics to classify bios as political or not. We consider users’ bios from before the beginning of the experiment. Approximately half of our subjects had political references in their pre-experiment bios. Figure B.7 shows that subjects whose bio did not contain political references behave similarly to those whose bio contained this type of content. As discussed in the previous paragraph, these two pieces of evidence suggest that suspicions about the experimental accounts’ lack of authenticity are not driving our results.

5.4.4 Differential Timing and Salience of the Election

Apart from studying the interplay between sharing different dimensions of identity, our experimental design allows us to study how the follow-back and blocking behavior changes over time. This analysis could be particularly interesting since we ran the experiment during the second semester of 2022, both before, during, and after the campaign period of the 2022 presidential election in Brazil. We hypothesize that, during the election, the salience of the political dimension of identity would increase relative to the affective identity, reducing the importance of sharing this dimension of identity on the formation of social ties.

To investigate this possibility, we use two pre-registered strategies to study this hypothesis. First, we consider the official campaign period as defined by Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court and compare results before, during, and after this official campaign period. Second, we create a google trends index of election salience and estimate whether results change in response to changes in salience as measured by this index. Both analyses are detailed in Appendix C. Overall, results using both methods indicate that there has been some change in behavior during our experimental period; however, these changes are small and do not always point in the same direction (particularly when we compare results for blocks and follow-backs). Therefore, there is no consistent evidence that subjects’ behavior changed significantly according to the election salience or to the campaign calendar, suggesting that the degree of polarization was high throughout the experimental period.

6 Additional Evidence: Partisan Reactions during the World Cup

The experimental evidence discussed so far indicates that, in a setting of intense affective polarization, political identity hinders the formation of ties that could exist based on other shared identities. However, the behavior we study — follow-backs and blocks on social media — may be specific and not representative of how politically engaged Brazilians interact with politically-opposite individuals. To provide additional evidence on how political identity can overshadow other dimensions of identity, we analyze tweets by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users during the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

The World Cup is a widely popular tournament in Brazil: over 85% of Brazilians claimed

to be interested in the 2022 edition (TGMResearch, 2022). Notably, several players from the national team were politically engaged during the election (which happened approximately one month before the football tournament). Many of them had widely known political preferences towards one of the two polarizing candidates in the Presidential election. By studying the reactions of Twitter users to events involving these politically-engaged players during the tournament, we can analyze how the political identity of players affected the supporters’ reactions. Overall, we document that the level of criticism or cheering for players and the team’s coach during the tournament depended on the congruence or incongruence between supporters and players’ political identity. We interpret this result as additional evidence that, in a polarized setting, political identities can overshadow other dimensions of identity (in this case, national identity), affecting social interactions in domains seemingly unrelated to politics. Moreover, this result speaks directly to the literature showing that success in international football tournaments can improve social cohesion and foster national identity (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020). The behavior we document suggests that these effects may be diminished in a politically polarized setting.

6.1 Background, Data and Methods

We focus on tweets from users in Brazil during this country’s World Cup matches. Using Twitter’s API, we collect all Twitter users based in Brazil that tweeted or re-tweeted a status containing a pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro hashtag in the week before the first round of the 2022 Presidential election (from September 25th to October 1st, 2022). The list of hashtags used is the same as the one used to obtain the subject pool in the field experiment (see Appendix B). This procedure gives us approximately 200 thousand individual accounts, of which 49.8% are classified as pro-Lula, and 50.2% as pro-Bolsonaro.

After obtaining these accounts, we randomly sampled 10% of the pro-Lula and 10% of the pro-Bolsonaro accounts. Then, using Twitter’s API again, we collected all tweets and re-tweets sent by these accounts in the intervals spanning two hours before and two hours after Brazil’s matches in the World Cup.²² For Brazil’s debut game against Serbia, this gives us 230,953 tweets by 17,701 users. We focus on this game to illustrate our research design. In this game, Brazil beat Serbia by 2×0 , with both goals scored by Richarlison — a player who had been a vocal critic of Bolsonaro before and during the election.²³ In the same match, Neymar — another well-known Brazilian player — suffered an injury that would cause him to miss the next two games in the tournament. Differently from Richarlison, Neymar was a vocal supporter of Jair Bolsonaro.²⁴

²²Brazil played five matches in this tournament.

²³Before the World Cup, Richarlison’s political positions were well known and featured on important news outlets in the country, such as the newspaper O Globo (O Globo, 09-13-2022) and the news website UOL (UOL, 11-22-2022). Richarlison would also frequently post political content in his social media accounts and publicly adopted positions contrary to Jair Bolsonaro’s government, such as becoming an Ambassador from the University of São Paulo in the fight against COVID and criticizing deforestation of the Amazon rainforest.

²⁴Before the first election round, Neymar posted a video demonstrating his support for Bolsonaro (G1, 09-29-2022). During his campaign, Bolsonaro also rallied at Neymar’s Institute in the city of Santos, and

Given the opposite political affiliations of these two players — who had prominent roles in the match we analyze — we ask whether reactions to events related to them differed depending on supporters’ political affiliations. To do so, we first compare the number of tweets sent by our sample of pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro regarding each of these players. To identify the topic of a tweet, we rely on generic keyword search (for instance, we search for terms associated with “Richarlison”). Next, we aggregate tweets in intervals of five minutes and, for each interval, compute the difference in the number of tweets about a given player sent by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts. We present results using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors to compute uniform confidence bands (using the plug-in method from [Montiel Olea and Plagborg-Møller \(2019\)](#)).

We perform a similar analysis for Brazil’s final match in the World Cup, against Croatia. This game happened in the knock-out stage (specifically, in the quarter-finals), and the loser would be eliminated from the tournament. Brazil lost in penalty shoot-outs after a 1×1 draw in regular time. Neymar scored Brazil’s goal. Moreover, many Brazilians blamed the team’s coach, Tite, for the defeat. Importantly, Tite was widely considered a Lula supporter.²⁵ Thus, we analyze tweets regarding Tite, focusing on the difference in tweets by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users sent in the minutes after the defeat.

Apart from simply comparing the number of tweets from a given topic, we are interested in the content of tweets. Therefore, using a Bayesian Classifier Algorithm, we classify tweets in our sample on whether they have political content. Specifically, we manually analyzed a random sample of 2,000 tweets per match, classifying whether they had political content. We then used this data to train a Naïve Bayesian Classifier algorithm, which then predicted whether the remaining tweets in our dataset had political content. This procedure is standard in the literature (for instance, see [Alrababa’h et al. \(2021\)](#)).²⁶

6.2 Results

We focus our analysis on two of Brazil’s games in the 2022 World Cup: the country’s debut game against Serbia and its last game against Croatia. Both games are interesting case studies to illustrate how political identities shaped interactions with the national team during this tournament. First, in Brazil’s opening game, Richarlison (a player publicly against president Bolsonaro) scored the two winning goals, while Neymar (who had backed Bolsonaro during the electoral campaign) left the game injured. Analyzing how pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro Twitter users reacted to these events may be informative about how political identity shaped interactions during the World Cup. Similarly, the game between Brazil and Croatia, which happened in the knock-out stage, presents interesting opportunities to study this topic. After a draw in regular time, Neymar scored a potentially winning

Neymar promised to dedicate his first World Cup goal to the former president.

²⁵In the months preceding the World Cup, Tite had tried to adopt a politically-neutral position, arguing that “his activity is not mixed with politics” ([Folha de S. Paulo, 12-04-2018](#)). However, his avoidance to meet Bolsonaro ([Folha de S. Paulo, 07-07-2019](#)) and a previous photograph with Lula ([Poder 360, 05-06-2021](#)) led many Brazilians to consider the coach politically-aligned with the left-wing candidate.

²⁶The out of sample performance of our classifier was of 62% accuracy, 79% precision and 50% recall.

goal at the end of the first half of overtime; Brazil would then suffer a goal and lose in the penalty shootout, getting disqualified from the tournament. One interesting question, therefore, is how Brazilians with different political affiliations reacted to Neymar’s goal and the subsequent elimination.

6.2.1 Brazil x Serbia

We start by plotting raw trends in the number of tweets sent by users in our sample during Brazil’s debut match. Appendix Figure B.8 plots the number of tweets or re-tweets (on any topic) sent by pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro users in our sample in intervals of five minutes, starting 2 hours before Brazil’s face-off against Serbia and finishing two hours after the game ended. The plot also highlights the timing of the two goals scored by Brazil in this game — both scored by Richarlison. Before the game started, the number of tweets sent by the two groups of Twitter users was extremely similar, fluctuating around a mean of approximately 800 tweets every five minutes. After the game begins, there is a slight increase in the average number of tweets in both groups, but the trajectories of both groups remain the same.

However, after Richarlison scored his first goal, we see a substantial spike in the number of tweets sent by pro-Lula accounts, not accompanied by a comparable increase in the number of tweets by pro-Bolsonaro accounts. The difference remains until after the game ends — the number of tweets by pro-Lula accounts only returns to the same level as those by pro-Bolsonaro accounts over one hour after Richarlison scored his second goal.

The trends in Appendix Figure B.8 suggest that the reactions to Richarlison’s goals — which led Brazil to a victory in their first World Cup match — significantly differed between pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro Twitter users. Given that Richarlison was publicly critical of Jair Bolsonaro’s government, one potential explanation for the phenomenon we document is that political identities mediated Brazilian’s interactions with the national team, leading to fewer celebrations by individuals with political identities opposite to that of the players.

To further investigate this hypothesis, we analyze the difference in the number of tweets explicitly about Richarlison. Figure 8a plots the difference in the number of tweets about Richarlison posted by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts for every five-minute interval in our time window. In line with what the raw trends suggested, the plot shows a statistically significant difference in the number of tweets about this player between pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts after he scored his first goal. Indeed, after the first goal, pro-Lula accounts were more likely than pro-Bolsonaro accounts to tweet about Richarlison. Moreover, this difference remained throughout the entire time frame we analyzed (up til two hours after the match).

This result reinforces the interpretation that Twitter users who shared political identities with Richarlison were likelier to engage with his goals. But what about the content of the tweets sent? We use two strategies to present some evidence in this regard. First, Appendix Figures B.9a and B.9b present word clouds with the most used words in tweets related to Richarlison during the game for pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users, respectively. Comparing the words used by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts, we see that words related

to Richarlison’s social activism, such as “science” and “ambassador” (he was an ambassador in the fight against Covid for the University of São Paulo) appear relatively more frequently among pro-Lula users. Moreover, the words “Lula” and “voter” also appear frequently among pro-Lula accounts, revealing that these users highlighted the player’s political affiliation in their tweets.²⁷ Therefore, pro-Lula users were not only more likely to tweet about Richarlison after his goals but also to highlight his political identity when doing so.

While analyzing word clouds is interesting, analyzing the tweets’ content more systematically is also relevant. To do so, we use a Bayesian classifier algorithm to predict whether tweets in our sample had political content. Figure 8c reports the difference in the rate of tweets about Richarlison posted by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts, this time dividing tweets between those with or without political content. This analysis reveals that the difference we previously found is driven by tweets with political content. Hence, as suggested by the word clouds, pro-Lula accounts frequently celebrated Richarlison’s goals by highlighting his political identity.

Finally, while Richarlison was critical of Bolsonaro, Neymar — possibly the most famous Brazilian footballer currently playing professionally — publicly supported this candidate during the elections. Apart from not scoring in the first match, Neymar suffered an injury that caused him to miss the tournament’s next two games. How did pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro Twitter users react to Neymar during this game, especially after his injury?

To answer this question, we repeat the previous analysis focusing on tweets about Neymar. Results are displayed in Figures 8b (overall differences between pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users) and 8d (heterogeneity by political content of tweets). Pro-Lula users were slightly more likely to tweet about Neymar since the beginning of the game. However, unlike the results for Richarlison, after Neymar’s injury, pro-Lula users were likelier to tweet about this player, particularly with political content. This average result is also in line with the word clouds of tweets about Neymar by the two political groups (Appendix Figures B.9c and B.9d): pro-Lula users were likely to mention that Neymar had been accused of evading taxes, as well as cite Bolsonaro.²⁸ On the other hand, tweets by pro-Bolsonaro accounts

²⁷We reproduce here a few illustrative examples of tweets sent by pro-Lula accounts in this context (translated by us):

- “Richarlison: 2 goals, not *bolsonarista* and doesn’t owe to the IRS, I am so happy”;
- “The only one who isn’t *bolsominion*! Wonderful Richarlison”
- “And who scored? One of the few decent players of this tiny national team, Richarlison c’mon! He voted for Lula, knows where he comes from, and honors his country’s jersey!”

²⁸There are tweets explicitly celebrating Neymar’s injury (particularly compared with Richarlison’s success). We reproduce some examples here:

- “Who needs Neymar when they have Richarlison? Apart from being against Bolsonaro, he has no debt with the IRS.”
- “Brazil won, Richarlison scored, Neymar left the game crying. I couldn’t be happier!”
- “The game got so good without Neymar, the tax evader who supports a coup. I hope he doesn’t return until the end of the World Cup.”
- “The tax evader is out of the World Cup? I can’t believe God can be that good.”

about Neymar seem to be more neutral and even express more direct concern; indeed, words such as “preocupado” (worried) and “sofreu” (suffered) appear relatively frequently. Therefore, after Neymar’s injury, pro-Lula Twitter users were disproportionately more likely to tweet or re-tweet about this player — in particular, they were more likely to tweet or re-tweet content celebrating the player’s injury or his lack of success in the game, while also highlighting his political identity.

The analysis of tweets about Neymar reinforces the results of the analysis of tweets about Richarlison. In both cases, we find significant differences in interactions between pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users, suggesting that, in a polarized setting such as Brazil at the time, political identities mediated how Brazilians interacted with players of the national team. Combined with the results from the experiment, this case study illustrates that, in contexts of high affective polarization, political identities may overshadow other dimensions of identity, leading to less social ties across partisan lines and, in this case, to changes in how individuals engage with the national team. In particular, this suggests that, in a polarized setting, political identities may reduce the potential of collective experiences — support of the national team — to increase social cohesion.

6.2.2 Brazil x Croatia

Another interesting case study is the quarter-finals match between Brazil and Croatia. This game happened during the knockout stage (i.e., the loser would be eliminated from the World Cup). After a draw in regular time, Neymar scored a potentially winning goal in the first half of overtime. However, Croatia would draw the game and win in the penalty shoot-out, eliminating Brazil. Appendix Figure B.10 shows that, while pro-Lula users tweeted more frequently than pro-Bolsonaro accounts since the beginning of the game, there is no clear pattern after the most relevant events of the match (Brazil’s goal and ultimate elimination).

We start by analyzing how pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users reacted to the elimination. We focus particularly on criticism towards the Brazilian coach, Tite, who was widely considered a Lula supporter. Analyzing tweets about Tite by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts during and after the game, it is clear that pro-Bolsonaro accounts disproportionately posted tweets and re-tweets about Tite immediately after Brazil lost the penalty shoot-out, as shown in Figure 9a. After the game ended, pro-Bolsonaro accounts posted, on average, 0.1 tweets about Tite more than pro-Lula accounts every five minutes. This difference remained for approximately two hours after the game ended.

The word clouds of tweets posted after the end of the game, displayed in Appendix Figure B.11, also suggest that both pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts posting about Tite were critical of the coach. For example, both groups frequently cite the word “vestiário” (locker room), criticizing the fact that Tite went to the locker room immediately after the game instead of talking to the players. In addition, there are other generic negative words (such as arrogant, hate, and dumb) in both groups. Interestingly, however, the word cloud of pro-Bolsonaro accounts contains several words related to the coach’s (alleged) political affiliation:

words such as “comunista” (communist) and “Lula” appear frequently and do not appear among pro-Lula tweeters. On the other hand, “Neymar” frequently appears among pro-Lula tweets, suggesting that this pro-Bolsonaro player was a target of criticism from this group. To analyze this pattern more systematically, we divide tweets about Tite between those with political content or not. Figure 9b shows that, after the elimination, pro-Bolsonaro accounts were more likely to post tweets that were either explicitly political or not. Although the difference for tweets with political content is smaller than that for non-political tweets, it is highly statistically significant. Once again, this analysis reveals that political identities shaped reactions to the World Cup. In this case, pro-Bolsonaro criticism of Tite was more frequent and often focused on political differences.

6.3 Discussion

Overall, the two case studies discussed in this section illustrate situations in which political identities mediated interactions with the Brazilian national team during the 2022 World Cup — which happened in a context of intense affective polarization. Importantly, we show that this effect happened both in a celebratory context (after Richarlison’s goals) and a loss (after the elimination). In the case of a defeat, the mediating role of political identity on criticism against the Brazilian coach is expected, given that negative results tend to reinforce out-group animosity (Hewstone et al., 2002). On the other hand, the fact that shared political identities also impact reactions in a win is particularly interesting given the evidence that national teams victories enhance social cohesion (Depetris-Chauvin et al., 2020), or that the success of out-group football players may reduce animosity towards members of this group (Alrababa’h et al., 2021). Our results suggest that this type of effect may be reduced in a context of affective polarization, given that supporters only identify with players who share their political identity. This evidence complements our experimental analysis by showing another context in which political identity hinders interactions based on another shared identity. Indeed, while the World Cup could be seen as an opportunity to increase cohesion through shared experience, we find that political differences make it harder for supporters to identify with the national team.

Conclusion

Affective polarization has been growing recently in many countries, and there is an intense debate about the potential consequences of this phenomenon on social interactions. We contribute to this debate by conducting a field experiment and analyzing observational data on Twitter to study the interplay between political identity and football club preference — a relevant dimension of identity for many Brazilians — in forming social ties. Both dimensions of identity are relevant to forming ties, but the effect of sharing political identity is considerably greater.

Our main contribution is to show that, in a setting of intense affective polarization, such as Brazil (particularly during an election), political identities are capable of overshadowing

other dimensions of identity in the formation of ties. Indeed, the effect of supporting the same football club is much smaller when a bot signals its political preference than when it does not. This suggests that signaling political identity undermines connections that could have been formed if such identity had not been signaled. We show that this type of phenomenon happened not only experimentally, but also in the way Brazilian supporters reacted to events during the FIFA World Cup. While sportive events have the potential of fostering national identity and social cohesion, we show that this potential is hindered in a polarized context, since interactions with the national team become mediated by political identities. Thus, we document that a potential consequence of affective polarization is to reduce social interactions that could be formed based on other shared interests or experiences.

This observation has important implications. First, by showing that one potential consequence of affective polarization is to overshadow other dimensions of identity, we suggest one mechanism through which affective polarization may affect social interactions. Indeed, we show that, in our setting, people not only sort in terms of their political preference but also reduce the relative importance they attach to other dimensions of identity in forming ties. This behavior would lead people to have fewer opportunities to be in contact with dissenting views or have collaborative contact with politically opposite individuals, potentially changing people’s attitudes and values, and ultimately increasing segregation and polarization.

Moreover, this result has implications for the debate about the relationship between social media and polarization. Many analysts argue that social media amplifies polarization by creating echo chambers (Sunstein, 2018). Our experiment shows that online echo chambers are created not only via algorithmic suggestions or the reproduction of relationships outside of social media but also via individuals actively choosing to connect with those politically similar. This type of sorting may also reduce the exposure of individuals to dissenting views, further contributing to polarization.

However, we also show that sharing affective identity — preference for the same football club — still fosters ties in our setting, even among politically opposite individuals. This finding may seem at odds with the previous one, but they are consistent with each other. Signaling political identity did reduce the effect of affective congruence, overshadowing this dimension of identity. Nevertheless, the positive effect of sharing an affective identity was still present, despite being small. This observation suggests that other dimensions of shared identity — in particular, preference for a football club — have the potential to reduce politically induced societal divides. This result is particularly relevant considering that the subjects in our sample are politically-engaged and that the experiment took place during and right after an election period. Such potential of other shared identities could be explored in interventions aimed at reducing affective polarization, such as in conversations between supporters of opposing parties. Moreover, the positive effect of shared football club appeared even when a bot signaled political identity more saliently. Thus, highlighting similarities across other identities may be an avenue to reduce political animosity and foster ties across partisan lines. One interesting direction of future research would be to analyze how shared identities can be best exploited to reduce political divides.

Finally, this paper does have some limitations that suggest other possible directions for future research. First, while the experiment was conducted over a relatively long period, it

started in a context where the Brazilian presidential elections were relatively close — and, therefore, salient. Thus, it would be interesting to analyze the behaviors we studied further away from an election period to verify how they change when the political identity is even less salient. Finally, since our sample is composed of politically-engaged individuals and our experiment happened during a highly polarized period, we are unable to assess whether the type of behavior we document would generalize to other individuals and other periods. Yet, the main objective of the experiment was to study whether political identities could undermine the formation of ties due to other shared identities, particularly in a context of affective polarization. Demonstrating that this is indeed the case is fundamental to advance our understanding of the consequences of affective polarization, and the mechanisms that can reinforce or reduce such polarization.

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
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Figures

Figure 1: Trends in Affective Polarization, Brazil (Boxell et al. (2022)'s method)



Notes: The figure presents trends in affective polarization in Brazil, using data from the Brazilian Electoral Study (BES), a national post-electoral survey undertaken since 2002. Following Boxell et al. (2022), we estimate affective polarization as the mean difference between in-party and out-party feeling among respondents who claim to identify with a given party. Error bars display 95% confidence intervals for the affective polarization index in each election year, and the blue line displays a fitted bivariate linear regression line with affective polarization as the dependent variable and the survey year as the independent one. The plot reports the slope (change per year) and estimated 95% confidence interval computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in the top-left.

Figure 2: Examples of Bot Accounts



(a) Pro-Bolsonaro; Flamengo supporter



(b) Pro-Lula; Palmeiras supporter




(c) Pro-Lula; Neutral-Team




(d) Politically Neutral, Flamengo supporter

Notes: The figures show examples of bot accounts used in the experiment.

Figure 3: Example of treatment notifications on desktop and mobile Twitter apps



(a) Desktop Notification




(b) Desktop Notification (after hovering the mouse's cursor over the bot's profile)




(c) Mobile app notification

Figure 4: Effect of shared affective identity (football club preference) on the formation of social ties – Experimental accounts that do not signal political preference




Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing affective identity (football club preference) on the rate of follow-backs and blocks. The sample is composed of the subject-bot pairs of politically neutral bots (i.e., we only consider bots that do not signal political identity). The figure on the left shows the average rate of follow-backs or bots for the entire experiment, excluding shadow-banned accounts. The p-value on these plots is the p-value of a simple t-test of difference in means between the two groups. The left-hand side plot shows the coefficients estimated from equation (1), which includes wave and strata fixed effects. The controls used are the bot’s football club, the google trend index of the clubs, subject’s number of followers and statuses, interacted with the treatment indicator. The plots show 95% confidence intervals (error bar), coefficient estimates and p-values (in brackets). Confidence intervals and p-values are computed using standard errors clustered at the bot account level.

Figure 5: Effect of shared political identity on the formation of social ties – Experimental accounts that do not signal football club preference




Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing political identity on the rate of follow-backs and blocks. The sample is composed of the subject-bot pairs of affectively neutral bots (i.e., we only consider bots that do not signal football club preference). The figure on the left shows the average rate of follow-backs or bots for the entire experiment, excluding shadow-banned accounts. The p-value on these plots is the p-value of a simple t-test of difference in means between the two groups. The left-hand side plot shows the coefficients estimated from equation (1), which includes wave and strata fixed effects. The controls used are the bot’s football club, the google trend index of the clubs, subject’s number of followers and statuses, interacted with the treatment indicator. The plots show 95% confidence intervals (error bar), coefficient estimates and p-values (in brackets). Confidence intervals and p-values are computed using standard errors clustered at the bot account level.

Figure 6: Effect of shared political and affective identity on the formation of social ties




(a) Follow Backs




(b) Blocks

Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing political and affective (football club) identity on the rate of follow-backs and blocks, for all eight treatment arms in the main experiment (bots that signal both or a single dimension of identity). The sample is composed of the subject-bot pairs in the experiment, pooling all waves and excluding shadow-banned accounts (as pre-registered). The x-axis shows whether bot and subject share political identity (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bots), while the colors show whether bot and subject share preference for football club (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bot). Each bar shows the average follow-back rate (panel a) and block-rate (panel b) for each of these treatment arms. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 7: Effect of shared political and affective identity on the formation of social ties:
Bot accounts with more salient political identity




(a) Follow Backs



(b) Blocks


Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing political and affective (football club) identity on the rate of follow-backs and blocks for the experiment with bot accounts with a more salient political identity. The figure on the left shows the average rate of follow-backs or bots for the entire experiment, excluding shadow-banned accounts. The p-value on these plots is the p-value of a simple t-test of difference in means between the two groups indicated by the bracket. The left-hand side plot shows the coefficients estimated from equation (2), which includes wave and strata fixed effects. The controls used are the bot’s football club, the google trend index of the clubs, subject’s number of followers and statuses, interacted with the treatment indicator. The plots show 95% confidence intervals (error bar), coefficient estimates and p-values (in brackets). Confidence intervals and p-values are computed using standard errors clustered at the bot account level.

Figure 8: Difference in the number of tweets about Neymar and Richarlison between pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro Twitter users during Brazil \times Serbia



Notes: The top two figures plot the difference in the number of tweets with specific themes posted by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts. Figure 8a displays results for tweets about Richarlison, while 8b displays results for tweets about Neymar. For every five minute interval, we compute the difference in the number of tweets about the specific topic sent by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts. The bottom two figures plot a similar exercise, but separating the analysis between tweets with political content or not. To classify tweets according to their content, we use a Bayesian Classifier algorithm. For every five minute interval, we compute the difference in the number of tweets with political content or not about the specific topic sent by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts. In all cases, data comes from a 10% random sample of all Brazilian Twitter users that tweeted or re-tweeted a status containing a pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro hashtag in the week before the first round of the 2022 presidential election. The error bars with ticks represent 95% heteroskedasticity-robust (point-wise) confidence intervals, while the extended bars represent 95% uniform sup-t confidence bands, estimated using Montiel Olea and Plagborg-Møller (2019)'s plug-in estimator.

Figure 9: Difference in the number of tweets about Tite between pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro Twitter users during Brazil \times Croatia



Notes: The top figure plots the difference in the number of tweets about Brazil’s coach Tite posted by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts. For every five minute interval, we compute the difference in the number of tweets about this specific topic sent by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts. The bottom figures plots a similar exercise, but separating the analysis between tweets with political content or not. To classify tweets according to their content, we use a Bayesian Classifier algorithm. For every five minute interval, we compute the difference in the number of tweets with political content or not about the specific topic sent by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro accounts. In all cases, data comes from a 10% random sample of all Brazilian Twitter users that tweeted or re-tweeted a status containing a pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro hashtag in the week before the first round of the 2022 presidential election. The error bars with ticks represent 95% heteroskedasticity-robust (point-wise) confidence intervals, while the extended bars represent 95% uniform sup-t confidence bands, estimated using [Montiel Olea and Plagborg-Møller \(2019\)](#)’s plug-in estimator.

Tables

Table 1: Procedures used to create the bot accounts

Element of Profile	Procedure
Profile Picture	For the accounts that signal their preferred team, the profile picture is a photo of the team’s logo in a flag inside a stadium; for the team-neutral accounts, the profile picture is a photo of the interior of a foreign football stadium during a football game (we chose photos in which the teams that were playing could not be identified). In all cases, we have a set of possible images, which are randomly chosen to construct each bot.
Name	Randomly generated by matching a list of the most common male first names and surnames in Brazil.
Bio	The Bio from the bot accounts contains two pieces of information: first, it either says “Supporter of team X” (if the account signals her preferred team) or “football fan” (if the account is team-neutral); second, it includes either the hashtag “#Lula2022” or “#Bolsonaro2022” (depending on the bot’s political identity). For the politically-neutral accounts, we merely remove this second part.
Background Image	A landscape from the city where the account’s preferred football team plays its home matches (and random city landscape for the football team-neutral accounts).
Location	The bot accounts’ profiles do not include a location. 25.5% of subjects’ profiles do not include a location.
Website	The bot accounts’ profiles do not include a website. 82.7% of subjects’ profiles do not include a website url.
Retweets	The bot account first re-tweets a post from an account related to her preferred football team or, in the case of team-neutral accounts, a general tweet about football (that isn’t specific about any football team). Then, the account re-tweets a post from its preferred political candidate. The post must necessarily have more than 500 re-tweets and not include any misleading information or hate speech. This way, the first post that is seen when someone accesses the bot’s profile is the one that signals political identity.
Followers	We asked a group of colleagues to follow the bot accounts before each experimental wave so that the bot accounts have some followers when subjects receive the notifications.
Following	One day before following the accounts randomly assigned to it, the bot account will follow a set of “elite” accounts related to its political identity and preferred team (for instance, it will follow the team’s official profile, the profile of its preferred candidate and of some of its allies).

Notes: The table summarizes the procedures used to create the bot accounts. Figure 2 on the Appendix shows examples of accounts.

Appendix

A Additional Information on Experimental Design

A.1 Pro-Lula and Pro-Bolsonaro Hashtags

Table A.1: List of pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro hashtags used to build the subject pool

Pro-Lula	Pro-Bolsonaro
#Lula2022	#Bolsonaro2022
#Lula22	#Bolsonaro22
#Lula13	#FechadoComBolsonaro
#LulaPresidente	#BolsonaroReeleito
#LulaNoPrimeiroTurno	#BolsonaroNoPrimeiroTurno
#VamosJuntosPeloBrasil	#BolsonaroOrgulhoDoBrasil
#JuntosComLula	#JuntosComBolsonaro
#BrasilComLula	#BrasilComBolsonaro

A.2 Football Club Rivalries


Table A.2: Football club rivalries

	Botafogo	Flamengo	Fluminense	Vasco	Corinthians	Palmeiras	Santos	São Paulo	Grêmio	Internacional
Flamengo	X	✓	X	X						
Vasco	X	X	X	✓						
Corinthians					✓	X	X	X		
Palmeiras					X	✓	X	X		
São Paulo					X	X	X	✓		
Grêmio									✓	X

Notes: The table displays the football club rivalries we considered when constructing the sample of subjects. The X mark indicates a rivalry. A bot that signals support for team A will only follow subjects whose preferred football club is either team A or team A's rival. We restricted ourselves to regional (inter-state rivalries). The clubs in the rows are the ones that a bot may support, while the clubs in the columns are the ones that subjects may support.

A.3 Experimental Timeline


Figure A.1: Experimental Timeline



Notes: The table shows the experimental timeline. We consider that each wave starts at the moment in which the bot accounts follow the subjects. The table also shows the periods we define as before, during, and after the election period, along with relevant dates.

A.4 Procedure to Obtain the Subject Pool


Figure A.2: Procedure to obtain the subject pool




B Additional Figures and Tables

B.1 Characteristics of Brazilian Football Club Supporters


Figure B.1: Characteristics of Brazilian Football Club Supporters




(a) Sex




(b) Race




(c) Age



(d) Education Level



(e) Income



(f) Religion

Notes: The figures show the proportion of supporters of each of the six most popular Brazilian clubs and its rivals across socio-economic characteristics. Data comes from [IPEC and O Globo \(2022\)](#). The left-most bar in each plot shows the proportion with each characteristic in the survey population. Clubs are ordered by number of supporters.

B.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Subject Pool

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Subject Pool - Numerical Variables

Variables	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	Obs.
Number of followers	2047.66	662	5685.92	11	141490	4652
Number of friends	2289.28	1057	5078.55	8	137451	4652
Number of statuses (tweets + rts)	25439.26	8050	58732.38	4	1665213	4652
Number of favorites (likes)	42152.19	17398	72984.66	0	1618281	4652
Year of account creation	2015.28	2016	4.66	2006	2021	4652
<i>Botometer</i> score	0.2	0.13	0.2	0	0.98	3878

Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the subject pool in the experiment. ‘*Botometer* score’ is a number between 0 and 1 generated by the *Botometer* API, which determines the probability that each subject is classified as an automated account. A higher score means that the account is more likely to be automated.

Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics of Subject Pool

Variables	% Classified	N	%	Variables	% Classified	N	%
Political Identity	100			Region	64.23		
Bolsonaro		2069	44.48	Center-West		216	7.23
Lula		2583	55.52	pro-Bolsonaro		117	54.17
Affective Identity				pro-Lula		99	45.83
Corinthians	100	566	12.17	Northeast		379	12.68
pro-Bolsonaro		156	27.56	pro-Bolsonaro		122	32.19
pro-Lula		410	72.44	pro-Lula		257	67.81
Palmeiras	100	485	10.43	North		123	4.12
pro-Bolsonaro		293	60.41	pro-Bolsonaro		58	47.15
pro-Lula		192	39.59	pro-Lula		65	52.85
São Paulo	100	403	8.66	Southeast		1746	58.43
pro-Bolsonaro		219	54.34	pro-Bolsonaro		760	43.53
pro-Lula		184	45.66	pro-Lula		986	56.47
Santos	100	165	3.55	South		418	13.99
pro-Bolsonaro		74	44.85	pro-Bolsonaro		199	47.61
pro-Lula		91	55.15	pro-Lula		219	52.39
Flamengo	100	1342	28.85	Foreign		106	3.55
pro-Bolsonaro		641	47.76	pro-Bolsonaro		67	63.21
pro-Lula		701	52.24	pro-Lula		39	36.79
Vasco	100	447	9.61	Gender	81.17		
pro-Bolsonaro		179	40.04	Female		844	22.35
pro-Lula		268	59.96	pro-Bolsonaro		268	31.75
Botafogo	100	245	5.27	pro-Lula		576	68.25
pro-Bolsonaro		102	41.63	Male		2932	77.65
pro-Lula		143	58.37	pro-Bolsonaro		1462	49.86
Fluminense	100	172	3.70	pro-Lula		1470	50.14
pro-Bolsonaro		69	40.12	Has background pic.	100	3930	84.48
pro-Lula		103	59.88	pro-Bolsonaro		1689	42.98
Grêmio	100	258	5.55	pro-Lula		2241	57.02
pro-Bolsonaro		118	45.74	Has website	100	804	17.28
pro-Lula		140	54.26	pro-Bolsonaro		253	31.47
Internacional	100	210	4.51	pro-Lula		551	68.53
pro-Bolsonaro		80	38.10				
pro-Lula		130	61.90				

Notes: The table displays summary statistics for the subject pool. Figure A.2 describes the procedure used to obtain the subjects. The variable political identity is obtained accordingly to the hashtag used by the subject, while affective identity is obtained from information in the subject’s bios. Region is created using self-declared information in the “location” field of the profile, which we recode to the regional level. % Classified is the percentage of all subjects for which we were able to obtain the variable. For each variable, we indicate the number of subjects (N) and the proportion of subjects in each category (the proportion is relative to the number of classified subjects). Finally, for each category, we show the proportion of subjects who are pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro. The variable Gender is obtained by using Brazilian Census data (organized by Meireles (2021)) to compute the proportion of men and women with each given name in the sample. A gender is assigned to a subject if at least 90% of his or her name’s occurrences in the 2010 census were of an specific gender.

B.3 Balance, Attrition, and Take-up

Table B.3: Balance Table

Variable	Treatment Arm								F Stat [p-value]
	Both Dimensions				Affectively Neutral Accounts		Politically Neutral Accounts		
	In-politics; In-affective	In-politics; Out-affective	Out-politics; In-affective	Out-politics; Out-affective	In-politics; Neutral-affective	Out-politics; Neutral-affective	Neutral-politics; In-affective	Neutral-politics; Out-affective	
Number of followers	1,858.1 (4,899.3)	1,939.5 (4,816.2)	1,826.5 (4,584.2)	2,032.1 (5,387.3)	2,077.4 (6,220)	1,962 (5,001.6)	1,839 (5,067.6)	2,032.2 (5,987.4)	0.0137 [1.00]
Number of friends	2,190.1 (4,548.3)	2,191.7 (3,898.6)	2,074.4 (3,958.3)	2,302.9 (4,779.3)	2,313.7 (5,556)	2,221.4 (4,368.3)	2,132.8 (4,587.9)	2,312.9 (5,494.9)	0.0146 [1.00]
Number of statuses ('tweets + rts')	24,448 (55,867.4)	24,873.2 (51,507.3)	25,061.3 (56,480.8)	24,909.8 (53,622.5)	24,775.2 (51,148.7)	25,720.6 (50,935.8)	24,168.4 (60,306.6)	26,130.1 (64,734.1)	0.0055 [1.00]
Number of favorited statuses ('likes')	43,139.1 (87,867.7)	43,136.6 (73,385.3)	44,731.2 (83,492.9)	40,517.3 (63,641.3)	44,915.1 (82,595.3)	41,968.2 (69,698.8)	42,112 (81,036.1)	42,084.4 (71,119.9)	0.0154 [1.00]
Number of lists	4.024 (24.8)	4.164 (20.1)	4.133 (28.8)	4.33 (25.2)	4.056 (20.5)	3.619 (13.4)	3.157 (10)	4.184 (19.1)	0.0119 [1.00]
Account is verified	0.001 (0.033)	0.001 (0.028)	0.002 (0.043)	0.001 (0.023)	0.002 (0.039)	0.002 (0.046)	0 (0.018)	0.002 (0.04)	0.0129 [1.00]
Year of account creation	2,015.1 (4,599)	2,015.1 (4,689)	2,015.2 (4,582)	2,015.1 (4,653)	2,015 (4,585)	2,015.2 (4,59)	2,015.1 (4,599)	2,015 (4,655)	0.0104 [1.00]
Has background picture	0.839 (0.368)	0.843 (0.363)	0.841 (0.366)	0.838 (0.368)	0.839 (0.368)	0.83 (0.376)	0.833 (0.373)	0.838 (0.368)	0.0054 [1.00]
Gender (1=Female)	0.173 (0.378)	0.172 (0.377)	0.175 (0.38)	0.184 (0.387)	0.169 (0.375)	0.186 (0.389)	0.188 (0.391)	0.179 (0.383)	0.0138 [1.00]
Region									
Center-West	0.043 (0.202)	0.036 (0.186)	0.041 (0.198)	0.031 (0.172)	0.042 (0.2)	0.041 (0.199)	0.045 (0.207)	0.041 (0.198)	0.0214 [1.00]
Northeast	0.065 (0.246)	0.064 (0.244)	0.075 (0.264)	0.064 (0.245)	0.067 (0.25)	0.07 (0.255)	0.082 (0.275)	0.06 (0.238)	0.0311 [1.00]
North	0.021 (0.144)	0.017 (0.128)	0.024 (0.154)	0.023 (0.15)	0.023 (0.15)	0.021 (0.143)	0.032 (0.177)	0.016 (0.126)	0.0443 [1.00]
Southeast	0.311 (0.463)	0.335 (0.472)	0.303 (0.459)	0.329 (0.47)	0.311 (0.463)	0.295 (0.456)	0.329 (0.47)	0.335 (0.472)	0.0458 [1.00]
South	0.082 (0.274)	0.072 (0.258)	0.082 (0.274)	0.07 (0.255)	0.072 (0.259)	0.071 (0.258)	0.09 (0.286)	0.071 (0.257)	0.0283 [1.00]
Foreign	0.02 (0.139)	0.02 (0.141)	0.02 (0.141)	0.02 (0.14)	0.021 (0.144)	0.018 (0.133)	0.015 (0.12)	0.016 (0.126)	0.0113 [1.00]
Number of treated observations	3783	3761	3790	3794	3845	3833	3003	4385	
%	0.125	0.125	0.126	0.126	0.127	0.127	0.099	0.145	
Attrition (not treated)	379	415	396	384	346	363	356	378	0.0367 [1.00]
% of assigned to treatment	0.091	0.099	0.095	0.092	0.083	0.087	0.106	0.079	
Always active (tweeted every week)	2863	2830	2900	2923	2901	2908	2300	3353	0.0091 [1.00]
% of treated	0.757	0.752	0.765	0.77	0.754	0.759	0.766	0.765	
Active 1 day before treatment	2965	2948	2947	2994	3030	2969	2253	3435	0.0319 [1.00]
% of treated	0.784	0.784	0.778	0.789	0.788	0.775	0.75	0.783	

Notes: The table displays average and standard deviations for subject-level variables across the eight treatment arms in the experiment. The F-statistic is computed from a regression of the pre-treatment variable on the treatment indicators. For all pre-treatment variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of means across all eight treatments. The row "Number of treated obs." shows the number of treated observations (i.e., accounts followed by a bot) for each treatment arm, while "%" shows the percentage treated among all treated participants. The row "Attrition" shows the number of participants assigned to each treatment that could not be treated (either because they de-activated their account, were suspended by Twitter, or chose to make their profile private). The row "Always active" show the number and proportion of subjects that tweeted at least once in the seven days before every experimental wave (not only those in which they were specifically treated), while "Active 1 day before treatment" show the number of subjects who had Twitter activity (tweets or re-tweets) one day before treatment.

Table B.4: Balance Table - Attrited subjects

Variable	Treatment Arm								F Stat [p-value]
	Both Dimensions				Affectively Neutral Accounts		Politically Neutral Accounts		
	In-politics; In-affective	In-politics; Out-affective	Out-politics; In-affective	Out-politics; Out-affective	In-politics; Neutral-affective	Out-politics; Neutral-affective	Neutral-politics; In-affective	Neutral-politics; Out-affective	
Number of followers	2,632.7 (6,739.1)	2,230.8 (5,147.4)	2,639.5 (6,707.1)	2,037.3 (4,794.8)	3,466.9 (8,311.2)	1,919.2 (3,758.9)	2,968.2 (8,108.2)	3,806.9 (9,896.4)	0.3768 [0.916]
Number of friends	2,913.8 (5,836.6)	2,474.6 (4,405.6)	2,944.9 (6,389.1)	2,357.5 (4,600.4)	3,666.6 (7,612.2)	2,281.9 (3,614.7)	2,975.4 (7,165.1)	3,832.6 (8,813.5)	0.3385 [0.936]
Number of statuses ('tweets + rts')	32,189.6 (102,192.6)	27,035.1 (54,890.2)	29,585.8 (97,306.3)	25,845.2 (58,804.4)	34,110.6 (105,093.3)	20,760.1 (35,136.7)	23,967.5 (55,960.2)	25,613.6 (48,499)	0.1369 [0.995]
Number of favorited statuses ('likes')	44,705.6 (68,391)	45,693 (83,868.8)	39,562.4 (65,426.9)	39,206.7 (66,475.1)	38,030.3 (62,098.3)	40,212.8 (66,975.1)	34,530.7 (66,181.8)	44,454.2 (72,858.7)	0.1215 [0.997]
Number of lists	3.011 (12.4)	2.949 (11.7)	4.869 (48.4)	2.227 (8.2)	4.107 (16)	1.683 (5.7)	2.408 (7.5)	2.705 (8.5)	0.1077 [0.998]
Account is verified	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0.003 (0.052)	0.1114 [0.998]
Year of account creation	2,017.4 (4.514)	2,017.5 (4.545)	2,017.6 (4.687)	2,017.4 (4.653)	2,017.1 (4.742)	2,017.3 (4.704)	2,018 (4.527)	2,017.7 (4.455)	0.1194 [0.997]
Has background picture	0.868 (0.339)	0.913 (0.282)	0.866 (0.341)	0.854 (0.353)	0.874 (0.333)	0.889 (0.315)	0.832 (0.374)	0.862 (0.345)	0.2075 [0.984]
Gender (1=Female)	0.108 (0.311)	0.137 (0.345)	0.096 (0.295)	0.112 (0.316)	0.126 (0.333)	0.13 (0.336)	0.168 (0.374)	0.16 (0.367)	0.2175 [0.981]
Region									
Center-West	0.018 (0.135)	0.036 (0.187)	0.025 (0.157)	0.023 (0.151)	0.031 (0.173)	0.026 (0.161)	0.064 (0.244)	0.039 (0.193)	0.2406 [0.975]
Northeast	0.063 (0.244)	0.036 (0.187)	0.056 (0.229)	0.049 (0.217)	0.045 (0.207)	0.058 (0.234)	0.046 (0.21)	0.061 (0.239)	0.0716 [0.999]
North	0.026 (0.16)	0.024 (0.154)	0.033 (0.178)	0.026 (0.159)	0.014 (0.118)	0.026 (0.161)	0.029 (0.168)	0.033 (0.179)	0.0537 [1.00]
Southeast	0.311 (0.464)	0.328 (0.47)	0.263 (0.441)	0.339 (0.474)	0.287 (0.453)	0.304 (0.461)	0.26 (0.439)	0.298 (0.458)	0.1537 [0.993]
South	0.071 (0.258)	0.063 (0.243)	0.076 (0.265)	0.102 (0.302)	0.104 (0.306)	0.087 (0.283)	0.061 (0.239)	0.085 (0.28)	0.1438 [0.995]
Foreign	0.021 (0.144)	0.034 (0.181)	0.018 (0.132)	0.036 (0.188)	0.02 (0.139)	0.032 (0.176)	0.026 (0.159)	0.028 (0.164)	0.0751 [0.999]
Attrition (not treated)	379	415	396	384	356	378	346	363	
% of assigned to treatment	0.091	0.099	0.095	0.092	0.106	0.079	0.083	0.087	


Notes: This table shows the average and standard deviations (in parentheses) of pre-treatment variables for subjects that suffered attrition at some point of the experiment. The last column in the table reports a F-test of joint equality of means across all treatment arms.

Table B.5: Differences between accounts that ever suffered attrition or did not

Variable	Never Attrited	Ever Attrited	T Stat [p-value]
Political identity (1=pro-Bolsonaro)	0.415 (0.493)	0.582 (0.494)	8.9246 [0.00]***
Number of followers	1,888.5 (5,357.4)	2,745.1 (6,923.8)	3.3879 [0.001]***
Number of friends	2,159 (4,833.2)	2,886.7 (6,059.9)	3.2766 [0.001]***
Number of statuses ('tweets + rts')	24,035.8 (50,720.5)	31,123.1 (82,900.1)	2.3951 [0.017]**
Number of favorited statuses ('likes')	41,183.4 (72,139.2)	46,212.4 (74,208.5)	1.7953 [0.073]*
Number of lists	4.143 (19.9)	4.235 (34.4)	0.0751 [0.94]
Account is verified	0.002 (0.04)	0.001 (0.034)	-0.3066 [0.759]
Year of account creation	2,014.9 (4.568)	2,016.8 (4.748)	10.3188 [0.00]***
Has background picture	0.841 (0.366)	0.861 (0.346)	1.5468 [0.122]
Gender (1=Female)	0.23 (0.421)	0.19 (0.393)	-2.3476 [0.019]**
Region			
Center-West	0.073 (0.261)	0.065 (0.247)	-0.662 [0.508]
Northeast	0.134 (0.34)	0.094 (0.292)	-2.7021 [0.007]***
North	0.038 (0.192)	0.057 (0.232)	1.68 [0.093]*
Southeast	0.578 (0.494)	0.615 (0.487)	1.5306 [0.126]
South	0.143 (0.35)	0.126 (0.332)	-1.0113 [0.312]
Foreign	0.033 (0.18)	0.043 (0.203)	0.9493 [0.343]
Number of observations	3782	851	
%	0.816	0.184	

Notes: The table compares average characteristics of subjects that never suffered attrition throughout all experimental waves ("never attrited") and those that suffered attrition at some point ('ever attrited'). Standard deviations are in parentheses. A subject is considered to have suffered attrition if we cannot find its account or cannot follow it on Twitter, which can happen if the user is suspended, deactivated its accounts, or made it private. The last column of the table displays the t-statistic and p-value of a test of difference in means for the respective variable between the two groups. Significance codes: *** : $p < 0.01$, ** : $p < 0.05$, * : $p < 0.1$.

Figure B.2: Evolution of Treatment Take-up



Notes: The figures display the evolution of experimental take up across experimental waves. The first figures considers all subjects, while the second is conditional on subjects who were active (i.e., tweeted or re-tweeted) at least 24 hours before treatment. The shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

B.4 Main Results: Comparison of Results across Treatment Arms and Robustness

Table B.6: Differences in Average Follow-Back Rate Across Treatment Arms

i/j	Out; Out		Out; No Signal		Out; In		No Signal; Out		No Signal; In		In; Out		In; No Signal		In; In	
Out-politics; Out-affective	$\Delta_{raw}(j-i)$ (Std. Error)	$\Delta_{FE,Controls}(j-i)$ (Std. Error)	0.009 (0.011)	0.012 (0.01)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.009)	0.069*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.01)	0.203*** (0.014)	0.188*** (0.013)	0.164*** (0.011)	0.164*** (0.011)	0.209*** (0.013)	0.21*** (0.011)	0.249*** (0.012)	0.244*** (0.012)
Out-politics; No signal affective					0.035*** (0.012)	0.035*** (0.012)	0.061*** (0.012)	0.037*** (0.011)	0.194*** (0.014)	0.18*** (0.013)	0.155*** (0.012)	0.151*** (0.011)	0.2*** (0.015)	0.199*** (0.015)	0.24*** (0.012)	0.228*** (0.012)
Out-politics; In-affective							0.026** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.159*** (0.014)	0.145*** (0.013)	0.12*** (0.012)	0.121*** (0.012)	0.165*** (0.014)	0.162*** (0.013)	0.205*** (0.012)	0.204*** (0.013)
No signal politics; Out-affective									0.134*** (0.013)	0.141*** (0.013)	0.095*** (0.012)	0.117*** (0.011)	0.139*** (0.014)	0.163*** (0.012)	0.179*** (0.012)	0.193*** (0.013)
No signal politics; In-affective											-0.039*** (0.015)	-0.033*** (0.013)	0.006 (0.016)	0.021 (0.014)	0.046*** (0.011)	0.042*** (0.013)
In-politics; Out-affective													0.045*** (0.014)	0.046*** (0.012)	0.085*** (0.011)	0.079*** (0.011)
In-politics; No signal affective															0.04*** (0.014)	0.031** (0.013)

Notes: The table displays differences in average follow-back rate between treatment arms. Each column or row represents one of the eight treatment arms in the experiment (the same ones displayed in Figure 6). The treatment arms are defined by whether bot and subject have congruent or incongruent identities in the political and affective (football club preference) dimensions. For each dimension (political or affective) we denote congruence using the term “in”, and incongruence with the term “out” (as in “in-group” and “out-group” ties). A third option is that the bot does not signal the dimension. For each treatment arm, we first inform the relationship between bot and subject’s political identity, and then affective (for example, “in; out” means that bot and subject share political identity and support rival clubs). Each table cell shows estimates and standard deviations for the difference in the average follow-back rate between the column and the row-treatment arm. In each cell, we report the raw difference between the groups, and the estimate including wave and strata fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the bot-account level are in parentheses. Significance codes: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$.

Table B.7: Differences in Average Blocking Rate Across Treatment Arms

i/j	Out; Out		Out; No Signal		Out; In		No Signal; Out		No Signal; In		In; Out		In; No Signal		In; In	
Out-politics; Out-affective	$\Delta_{raw}(j-i)$ (Std. Error)	$\Delta_{FE,Controls}(j-i)$ (Std. Error)	-0.017* (0.009)	-0.018** (0.009)	-0.061*** (0.008)	-0.06*** (0.008)	-0.124*** (0.008)	-0.123*** (0.008)	-0.137*** (0.007)	-0.127*** (0.007)	-0.136*** (0.007)	-0.135*** (0.007)	-0.139*** (0.007)	-0.141*** (0.008)	-0.141*** (0.007)	-0.14*** (0.007)
Out-politics; No signal affective					-0.044*** (0.008)	-0.044*** (0.007)	-0.107*** (0.006)	-0.104*** (0.006)	-0.12*** (0.006)	-0.121*** (0.006)	-0.119*** (0.006)	-0.119*** (0.006)	-0.123*** (0.006)	-0.123*** (0.006)	-0.124*** (0.006)	-0.123*** (0.006)
Out-politics; In-affective							-0.062*** (0.006)	-0.063*** (0.006)	-0.076*** (0.005)	-0.072*** (0.006)	-0.074*** (0.005)	-0.074*** (0.005)	-0.078*** (0.005)	-0.077*** (0.005)	-0.08*** (0.005)	-0.08*** (0.005)
No signal politics; Out-affective									-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.002)	-0.017*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.003)
No signal politics; In-affective											0.001 (0.003)	0 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
In-politics; Out-affective													-0.004* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)
In-politics; No signal affective															-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)

Notes: The table displays differences in average blocking rate between treatment arms. Each column or row represents one of the eight treatment arms in the experiment (the same ones displayed in Figure 6). The treatment arms are defined by whether bot and subject have congruent or incongruent identities in the political and affective (football club preference) dimensions. For each dimension (political or affective) we denote congruence using the term “in”, and incongruence with the term “out” (as in “in-group” and “out-group” ties). A third option is that the bot does not signal the dimension. For each treatment arm, we first inform the relationship between bot and subject’s political identity, and then affective (for example, “in; out” means that bot and subject share political identity and support rival clubs). Each table cell shows estimates and standard deviations for the difference in the average blocking rate between the column and the row-treatment arm. In each cell, we report the raw difference between the groups (column – row), and the estimate including wave and strata fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the bot-account level are in parentheses. Significance codes: ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$.

Table B.8: Main Results for Different Sub-samples: Experimental accounts that signal both dimensions of identity

Panel A: Follow Backs							
	<i>Dependent Variable: Follow Backs (1 = Yes)</i>						
	Full Sample			Never attrited	Tweeted every week	Active (1 day)	Unlikely to be automated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political congruence	0.1639*** (0.0108)	0.1643*** (0.0106)	0.1476*** (0.0139)	0.1439*** (0.0139)	0.1622*** (0.0165)	0.1606*** (0.0166)	0.1398*** (0.0172)
Affective congruence	0.0437*** (0.0087)	0.0424*** (0.0087)	0.0512*** (0.0114)	0.0473*** (0.0129)	0.0597*** (0.0145)	0.0551*** (0.0136)	0.0532*** (0.0154)
Political congruence × Affective congruence	0.0411*** (0.0129)	0.0387*** (0.0127)	0.0503*** (0.0170)	0.0531*** (0.0184)	0.0364* (0.0211)	0.0521** (0.0200)	0.0461* (0.0267)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,128	15,128	15,128	13,257	9,953	11,854	6,814
R ²	0.04856	0.08886	0.09909	0.09795	0.10527	0.10199	0.10824
<i>Dependent Variable: Blocks (1 = Yes)</i>							
	Full Sample			Never attrited	Tweeted every week	Active (1 day)	Unlikely to be automated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political congruence	-0.1355*** (0.0072)	-0.1354*** (0.0073)	-0.1267*** (0.0081)	-0.1062*** (0.0080)	-0.1193*** (0.0092)	-0.1469*** (0.0092)	-0.1329*** (0.0115)
Affective congruence	-0.0611*** (0.0076)	-0.0609*** (0.0076)	-0.0652*** (0.0093)	-0.0518*** (0.0093)	-0.0623*** (0.0115)	-0.0797*** (0.0115)	-0.0859*** (0.0139)
Political congruence × Affective congruence	0.0559*** (0.0078)	0.0553*** (0.0078)	0.0578*** (0.0097)	0.0457*** (0.0096)	0.0534*** (0.0120)	0.0707*** (0.0121)	0.0722*** (0.0150)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,737	14,737	14,737	12,945	9,718	11,501	6,645
R ²	0.05768	0.06426	0.06790	0.05552	0.06102	0.07730	0.07583

Notes: The table presents regression estimates for the effect of sharing identities on follow-backs (Panel A) and blocks (Panel B), for different sub-samples of subjects, considering only the accounts that signaled both dimensions of identity. The sample excludes shadow-banned accounts, as pre-registered and discussed in the text. The first three columns show estimates using the full sample, estimating Equation (2) with and without wave and strata fixed effects and additional controls. The controls used are bot's football club, clubs' Google Trends index, subjects' region, gender, number of followers and number of tweets. The remaining columns perform similar estimates using sub-samples of subjects. A subject suffers attrition if we cannot follow it during a wave (because its account was de-activated, suspended, or made private). The sample of "never attrited" subjects is composed exclusively of subjects that did not suffer this type of attrition at any wave. Subjects that tweeted at least once in the seven days before every treatment wave are considered always active. Active subjects are those who tweeted or re-tweeted a status one day before treatment. Finally, the last column considers the sub-sample composed of subjects with below median score from the *Botometer* API (specifically, subjects with less than 13% chance of being automated accounts), which estimates the probability that a Twitter account is automated. Standard errors clustered at the bot account level are in parentheses. Significance codes: *** : $p < 0.01$, ** : $p < 0.05$, * : $p < 0.1$.

Table B.9: Main Results for Different Sub-samples: Experimental accounts that signal a single dimension of identity

Panel A: Follow Backs, Affective Identity Only							
	<i>Dependent Variable: Follow Backs (1 = Yes)</i>						
	Full Sample			Never attrited	Tweeted every week	Active (1 day)	Unlikely to be automated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Affective congruence	0.1337*** (0.0133)	0.1413*** (0.0134)	0.1454*** (0.0187)	0.1548*** (0.0196)	0.1747*** (0.0212)	0.1604*** (0.0213)	0.1483*** (0.0211)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,388	7,388	7,388	6,583	4,983	5,688	3,500
R ²	0.02123	0.06732	0.08339	0.09017	0.09770	0.08595	0.08507
Panel B: Blocks, Affective Identity Only							
	<i>Dependent Variable: Blocks (1 = Yes)</i>						
	Full Sample			Never attrited	Tweeted every week	Active (1 day)	Unlikely to be automated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Affective congruence	-0.0134*** (0.0031)	-0.0126*** (0.0032)	-0.0132*** (0.0043)	-0.0113** (0.0046)	-0.0129** (0.0053)	-0.0135*** (0.0048)	-0.0183** (0.0070)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,199	7,199	7,199	6,424	4,859	5,516	3,423
R ²	0.00253	0.01003	0.01773	0.01529	0.01757	0.02072	0.02001
Panel C: Follow Backs, Political Identity Only							
	<i>Dependent Variable: Follow Backs (1 = Yes)</i>						
	Full Sample			Never attrited	Tweeted every week	Active (1 day)	Unlikely to be automated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political congruence	0.2000*** (0.0148)	0.1994*** (0.0147)	0.1979*** (0.0133)	0.1880*** (0.0135)	0.1982*** (0.0164)	0.2076*** (0.0162)	0.1797*** (0.0185)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,678	7,678	7,678	6,823	5,079	5,999	3,418
R ²	0.05092	0.08798	0.10159	0.09892	0.10616	0.10787	0.10123
Panel D: Blocks, Political Identity Only							
	<i>Dependent Variable: Blocks (1 = Yes)</i>						
	Full Sample			Never attrited	Tweeted every week	Active (1 day)	Unlikely to be automated
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political congruence	-0.1225*** (0.0062)	-0.1225*** (0.0061)	-0.1224*** (0.0060)	-0.1075*** (0.0058)	-0.1188*** (0.0074)	-0.1386*** (0.0068)	-0.1236*** (0.0085)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,492	7,492	7,492	6,668	4,961	5,830	3,324
R ²	0.05894	0.06775	0.07063	0.06323	0.07162	0.08179	0.08295

Notes: The table presents regression estimates for the effect of sharing identities on follow-backs (Panel A and C) and blocks (Panel B and D), for different sub-samples of subjects, considering only the accounts that signaled either affective (top two panels) or political (bottom two panels) identity. The sample excludes shadow-banned accounts, as pre-registered and discussed in the text. The first three columns show estimates using the full sample, estimating Equation (2) with and without wave and strata fixed effects and additional controls. The controls used are bot's football club, clubs' Google Trends index, subjects' region, gender, number of followers and number of tweets. Controls involving bot's football club are not included for the treatment arms with bots that only signal political identity. The remaining columns perform similar estimates using sub-samples of subjects. A subject suffers attrition if we cannot follow it during a wave (because its account was de-activated, suspended, or made private). The sample of "never attrited" subjects is composed exclusively of subjects that did not suffer this type of attrition at any wave. Subjects that tweeted at least once in the seven days before every treatment wave are considered always active. Active subjects are those who tweeted or re-tweeted a status one day before treatment. Finally, the last column considers the sub-sample composed of subjects with below median score from the *Botometer* API (specifically, subjects with less than 13% chance of being automated accounts), which estimates the probability that a Twitter account is automated. Standard errors clustered at the bot account level are in parentheses. Significance codes: *** : $p < 0.01$, ** : $p < 0.05$, * : $p < 0.1$.

B.5 Experiment with Bots with more Salient Political Identity

Figure B.3: Examples of Bot Accounts - More salient political identity




(a) Pro-Bolsonaro; São Paulo supporter



(b) Pro-Lula; Palmeiras supporter

Notes: The figures show examples of bot accounts used in the extra experiment, in which the political identity signal was more salient.

Figure B.4: Results of the main experiment for the same waves as experiment with more salient political identity



Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing political and affective (football club) identity on the rate of follow-backs and blocks for the bot accounts of the original experiment, restricting the analysis for the waves in which we conducted the extra experiment with bots with more salient political identity. The figure on the left shows the average rate of follow-backs or bots for the entire experiment, excluding shadow-banned accounts. The p-value on these plots is the p-value of a simple t-test of difference in means between the two groups indicated by the bracket. The left-hand side plot shows the coefficients estimated from equation (2), which includes wave and strata fixed effects. The controls used are the bot’s football club, the google trend index of the clubs, subject’s number of followers and statuses, interacted with the treatment indicator. The plots show 95% confidence intervals (error bar), coefficient estimates and p-values (in brackets). Confidence intervals and p-values are computed using standard errors clustered at the bot account level.

B.6 Other Robustness Exercises

Table B.10: Main Results Excluding Bots' Football Clubs

Panel A: Follow Backs, Affective Identity Only							
Excluded Club:	<i>Dependent Variable: Follow Backs (1 = Yes)</i>						
	- (1)	Flamengo (2)	Corinthians (3)	São Paulo (4)	Palmeiras (5)	Vasco (6)	Grêmio (7)
Affective congruence	0.1454*** (0.0187)	0.1402*** (0.0236)	0.1596*** (0.0197)	0.1519*** (0.0202)	0.1057*** (0.0217)	0.1617*** (0.0193)	0.1419*** (0.0200)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,388	5,167	6,567	5,756	6,148	6,649	6,653
R ²	0.08339	0.08352	0.08533	0.09057	0.08148	0.08547	0.08590
Panel B: Blocks, Affective Identity Only							
Excluded Club:	<i>Dependent Variable: Blocks (1 = Yes)</i>						
	- (1)	Flamengo (2)	Corinthians (3)	São Paulo (4)	Palmeiras (5)	Vasco (6)	Grêmio (7)
Affective congruence	-0.0132*** (0.0043)	-0.0159*** (0.0048)	-0.0119** (0.0049)	-0.0142*** (0.0046)	-0.0145*** (0.0053)	-0.0134*** (0.0047)	-0.0116** (0.0046)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,199	4,978	6,473	5,661	5,959	6,460	6,464
R ²	0.01773	0.01653	0.01857	0.02276	0.01953	0.01848	0.01998
Panel C: Follow Backs, Both Dimensions of Identity							
Excluded Club:	<i>Dependent Variable: Follow Backs (1 = Yes)</i>						
	- (1)	Flamengo (2)	Corinthians (3)	São Paulo (4)	Palmeiras (5)	Vasco (6)	Grêmio (7)
Political congruence	0.1476*** (0.0139)	0.1429*** (0.0169)	0.1434*** (0.0153)	0.1497*** (0.0155)	0.1520*** (0.0149)	0.1500*** (0.0155)	0.1493*** (0.0151)
Affective congruence	0.0512*** (0.0114)	0.0266* (0.0150)	0.0520*** (0.0119)	0.0542*** (0.0134)	0.0605*** (0.0131)	0.0619*** (0.0118)	0.0469*** (0.0118)
Political congruence × Affective congruence	0.0503*** (0.0170)	0.0693*** (0.0203)	0.0583*** (0.0183)	0.0466** (0.0206)	0.0331* (0.0187)	0.0387** (0.0181)	0.0522*** (0.0176)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,128	10,464	13,205	11,928	12,755	13,647	13,641
R ²	0.09909	0.09980	0.10082	0.10415	0.09794	0.09836	0.10029
Panel D: Blocks, Both Dimensions of Identity							
Excluded Club:	<i>Dependent Variable: Blocks (1 = Yes)</i>						
	- (1)	Flamengo (2)	Corinthians (3)	São Paulo (4)	Palmeiras (5)	Vasco (6)	Grêmio (7)
Political congruence	-0.1267*** (0.0081)	-0.1159*** (0.0101)	-0.1227*** (0.0086)	-0.1283*** (0.0096)	-0.1293*** (0.0087)	-0.1284*** (0.0090)	-0.1268*** (0.0088)
Affective congruence	-0.0652*** (0.0093)	-0.0530*** (0.0107)	-0.0592*** (0.0100)	-0.0682*** (0.0109)	-0.0728*** (0.0101)	-0.0639*** (0.0103)	-0.0674*** (0.0101)
Political congruence × Affective congruence	0.0578*** (0.0097)	0.0437*** (0.0112)	0.0527*** (0.0105)	0.0599*** (0.0113)	0.0636*** (0.0106)	0.0590*** (0.0106)	0.0607*** (0.0103)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	14,737	10,073	13,011	11,731	12,364	13,256	13,250
R ²	0.06790	0.06653	0.06637	0.07301	0.07053	0.06778	0.06943


Notes: The table presents regression estimates for the effect of sharing affective identity on follow-backs (Panel A and C) and blocks (Panel B and D), considering only the accounts that signaled only affective identity (top two panels), or accounts that signaled both dimensions (bottom two panels). Specifically, it shows OLS estimates of specification 2, excluding one of the bot's clubs at a time. The sample excludes shadow-banned accounts, as pre-registered and discussed in the text. Standard errors clustered at the bot account level are in parentheses. Significance codes: *** : $p < 0.01$, ** : $p < 0.05$, * : $p < 0.1$.

Table B.11: Experiment Results Excluding Clubs Not Signaled by Bots


Panel A: Bots signaling affective Identity Only				
<i>Dependent Variables:</i>	Follow Backs (1 = Yes)		Blocks (1 = Yes)	
Sample:	Full	Excluding non-signaled Clubs	Full	Excluding non-signaled Clubs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Affective congruence	0.1454*** (0.0187)	0.1636*** (0.0204)	-0.0132*** (0.0043)	-0.0123** (0.0048)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,388	5,949	7,199	5,784
R ²	0.08339	0.08361	0.01773	0.01779
Panel B: Bots Signaling both Dimensions of Identity				
<i>Dependent Variables:</i>	Follow Backs (1 = Yes)		Blocks (1 = Yes)	
Sample:	Full	Excluding non-signaled Clubs	Full	Excluding non-signaled Clubs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political congruence	0.1476*** (0.0139)	0.1454*** (0.0171)	-0.1267*** (0.0081)	-0.1209*** (0.0096)
Affective congruence	0.0512*** (0.0114)	0.0455*** (0.0131)	-0.0652*** (0.0093)	-0.0577*** (0.0103)
Political congruence × Affective congruence	0.0503*** (0.0170)	0.0529*** (0.0195)	0.0578*** (0.0097)	0.0515*** (0.0106)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,128	12,326	14,737	11,964
R ²	0.09909	0.09614	0.06790	0.06223

Notes: The table presents regression estimates for the effect of sharing identity on follow-backs and blocks, considering treatment arms with bot accounts that signaled affective identity only (Panel A) or both dimensions of identity (Panel B). Columns (2) and (4) present results for a subsample of subjects that exclude those who support a club that was not among the six clubs signaled by bots during the experiment. Standard errors clustered at the bot account level are in parentheses. Significance codes: *** : $p < 0.01$, ** : $p < 0.05$, * : $p < 0.1$.


Figure B.5: Heterogeneity on type of content posted before treatment




(a) Follow Backs, subjects whose last tweet before treatment had political content



(b) Follow Backs, subjects whose last tweet before treatment did not have political content




(c) Blocks, subjects whose last tweet before treatment had political content




(d) Blocks, subjects whose last tweet before treatment did not have political content

Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing political and affective (football club) identity on the rate of follow-backs and blocks, for all eight treatment arms in the main experiment (bots that signal both or a single dimension of identity). The x-axis shows whether bot and subject share political identity (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bots), while the colors show whether bot and subject share preference for football club (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bot). Each bar shows the average follow-back rate (panels a and b) and block-rate (panels c and d) for each of these treatment arms. The figures report results for two sub samples of subjects: the ones whose last tweet before treatment had political content and the ones whose last tweet before treatment had other type of content. To classify tweets' content, we use a Naive Bayesian Classifier Algorithm. This analysis is restricted to waves 11 to 43 due to data constraints. We also restrict the analysis to subjects who tweeted at most one week before treatment. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure B.6: Effect of shared political and affective identity on the formation of social ties, Waves 11-43




(a) Follow Backs




(b) Blocks

Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing political and affective (football club) identity on the rate of follow-backs and blocks, for all eight treatment arms in the main experiment (bots that signal both or a single dimension of identity). The x-axis shows whether bot and subject share political identity (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bots), while the colors show whether bot and subject share preference for football club (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bot). Each bar shows the average follow-back rate (panel a) and block-rate (panel b) for each of these treatment arms. This analysis is restricted to waves 11 to 43, and to subjects who tweeted at most one week before treatment, in order to allow comparisons with the heterogeneity analysis of Appendix Figure B.5. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


Figure B.7: Heterogeneity on type of content in user’s pre-treatment bios




(a) Follow Backs, subjects whose bio had political content



(b) Follow Backs, subjects whose bio did not have political content



(c) Blocks, subjects whose bio had political content




(d) Blocks, subjects whose bio did not have political content

Notes: The figures show the effect of sharing political and affective (football club) identity on the rate of follow-backs and blocks, for all eight treatment arms in the main experiment (bots that signal both or a single dimension of identity). The x-axis shows whether bot and subject share political identity (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bots), while the colors show whether bot and subject share preference for football club (or show that this dimension is not signaled by the bot). Each bar shows the average follow-back rate (panels a and b) and block-rate (panels c and d) for each of these treatment arms. The figures report results for two sub samples of subjects: the ones whose bio (before treatment) had political content and the ones whose bio (before treatment) had other type of content. To classify bios’ content, we use a simple keyword search in a dictionary of words related to the Brazilian elections. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.


B.7 Analysis of Tweets during the World Cup: Additional Figures

Figure B.8: Number of tweets during Brazil vs. Serbia, 2022 FIFA World Cup



Notes: The figure displays the number of tweets sent by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users in the day of the match between Brazil and Serbia in the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Data comes from a 10% random sample of all Brazilian Twitter users that tweeted or re-tweeted a status containing a pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro hashtag in the week before the first round of the 2022 presidential election. Tweets are aggregated into intervals of five minutes.

Figure B.10: Number of tweets during Brazil vs. Croatia, 2022 FIFA World Cup



Notes: The figure displays the number of tweets sent by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users in the day of the match between Brazil and Croatia in the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Data comes from a 10% random sample of all Brazilian Twitter users that tweeted or re-tweeted a status containing a pro-Lula or pro-Bolsonaro hashtag in the week before the first round of the 2022 presidential election. Tweets are aggregated into intervals of five minutes.

Figure B.11: Word Clouds of Tweets by pro-Lula and pro-Bolsonaro users after Brazil x Croatia



(a) Tweets about Tite, pro-Lula users



(b) Tweets about Tite, pro-Bolsonaro users

Notes: The figures show word clouds for tweets and re-tweets posted in the two hours after Brazil's match against Croatia (when Brazil was eliminated), from our random sample of users.

C Formation of ties and salience of elections: alternative analysis using Google Trends

Apart from studying the interplay between sharing different dimensions of identity, our experimental design allows us to study how the follow-back and blocking behavior changes over time. This analysis could be particularly interesting since we ran the experiment during the second semester of 2022, both before, during, and after the campaign period of the 2022 presidential election in Brazil. We hypothesize that, during the election, the salience of the political dimension of identity would increase relative to the affective identity, reducing the importance of sharing this dimension of identity on the formation of social ties.

We use two pre-registered strategies to study this hypothesis. First, we consider the official campaign period as defined by Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court. The campaign period is the period in which candidates can legally present themselves to the population as presidential candidates, and in which their advertisement can be broadcast. Thus, we divide our experimental period into waves that happened before, during, and after this period. The timeline can be seen in Appendix Figure A.1. Specifically, we create indicators for each period (before, during, and after), and run a specification similar to equation (2) including interactions between the identity congruence indicators and the campaign period indicators.


Results using this method, for follow-backs and blocks, are displayed in Figure C.1, which restricts the analysis to subjects that were active on Twitter throughout the experimental period.²⁹ The left-hand side figures show results for follow-backs, and the right-hand side, for blocks. All figures plot the average effect of each identity congruence before, during, and after the election, considering the treatment arms of bots that signaled affective identity only (top), political identity only (middle), or both identities (bottom). These figures also show, for each dimension of identity, the estimated difference in behavior between periods (always relative to waves that happened during the official campaign period).

Reassuringly, when we consider bots that signal affective identity only, we find no difference in the effect of congruence in the affective dimension for waves that happened before, during, or after the election. This is expected because the election period should only change the salience of the political dimension (moreover, we control for specific club salience). On the other hand, there is some evidence of differential behavior for treatment arms with bots that signaled either their political identity or both dimensions. First, considering follow-backs, the subject’s behavior before and during the campaign is similar, both considering accounts signaling political identity only or signaling the two dimensions. Given that we began the experiment approximately one month before the official campaign period, this could indicate that polarization was already at a high level at this pre-campaign moment. Similarly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effect of sharing political identity is the same after and during the campaign period, even though the point-estimates for this effect after the campaign is relatively smaller than during this period.


The results for blocks are somewhat different: for the bots that signal both dimensions

²⁹This sample restriction was pre-registered and was done to guarantee that we compared similar sets of subjects over time. Results for the full sample are similar.


Figure C.1: Heterogeneity on Treatment Timing: Official Campaign Periods




(a) Effect on Follow Backs, bots signaling affective identity only




(b) Effect on Blocks, bots signaling affective identity only




(c) Effect on Follow Backs, bots signaling political identity only



(d) Effect on Blocks, bots signaling political identity only



(e) Effect on Follow Backs, bots signaling both dimensions of identity




(f) Effect on Blocks, bots signaling both dimensions of identity

Notes: The figures show the effect of shared political or affective identity on follow-backs (left) or blocks (right) depending on the treatment timing, dividing the experimental period according to the official campaign calendar of the Brazilian 2022 Presidential Election, as shown in Appendix Figure A.1. The sample consider treatment arms with bots that signaled political identity only (top), affective identity only (middle) or both dimensions of identity (bottom). We restrict the analysis to subjects that were active before every wave in which they were assigned to treatment (as pre-registered). We create indicators for the official campaign period and estimate an equation similar to (2) including interactions between each campaign period indicator and the identity congruence indicators. From these estimates, we obtain the average effect of identity congruence before, during, and after the campaign, as well as the estimated difference between each two periods. We plot the average effect of sharing identity in each period, as well as the difference in behavior pre and post-campaign relative to during. All plots show 95% confidence intervals, coefficient estimates and p-values in brackets. Confidence intervals and p-values are computed using standard errors clustered at the bot account level.

of identity, there is some evidence that sharing political identity had a larger effect on preventing blocks before the official campaign period. This result might reflect the fact that, when the experiment started, political polarization was already high or may be related to subjects becoming less active on Twitter over time, as discussed in the following section. Yet, comparing results during and after the campaign, we do not have evidence that the blocking behavior changed significantly.

The official campaign period may be unable to capture fluctuations in the salience of elections caused by relevant events such as debates or voting days, that can happen during the official campaign period. To take this into account, we also report heterogeneity results using an electoral salience measure based on the Google Trends Index (GTI) of search volume for the names of the two presidential candidates we analyzed (Lula and Bolsonaro). This measure may vary at every wave, capturing more subtle changes in electoral salience than the official campaign periods. To construct this political salience index, we collected the GTI in Brazil for the names of the two presidential candidates we analyzed (Lula and Bolsonaro) for the days corresponding to each experimental wave. The evolution of this index during our experimental period can be seen in Appendix Figure C.2.

Figure C.2: Google Trend Index during the Experimental Period for the Two Main Presidential Candidates in the Brazilian 2022 Presidential Elections



Notes: The figure displays the Google Trends Index for searches of the terms “Lula” and “Bolsonaro” in Brazil during the experimental period. The periods denoted as “before”, “during”, and “after” the campaign correspond to official campaign periods as determined by Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court.

The figure shows that the correlation between the GTI and the official campaign calendar exists, but is not perfect. During the official campaign period (from mid-August to the end of October) the average GTI is higher, but there are moments when we observe a spike in interest on the candidates (specifically, the first debates and the days around the first round and run-off election). Using the GTI allows us to capture this type of fluctuations in interest that would not be observed considering the official calendar. Our final GTI is the average between the index for each of the two candidates, in the first two days of each wave — since

these are the days in which the majority of follow-backs and blocks happen. We then run a specification similar to equation (2) including interactions between the GTI and the identity congruence indicators. Specifically, we estimate the following equation:

$$\begin{aligned}
Y_{ijst} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \times \text{political_congruence}_{ij} + \beta_2 \times \text{affective_congruence}_{ij} + \\
& \beta_3 \times \text{political_congruence}_{ij} \times \text{affective_congruence}_{ij} + \\
& \beta_4 \times \text{political_congruence}_{ij} \times GTI_t + \beta_5 \times \text{affective_congruence}_{ij} \times GTI_t + \\
& \beta_6 \times \text{political_congruence}_{ij} \times \text{affective_congruence}_{ij} \times GTI_t \\
& X_{ijt}\lambda + \delta_t + \theta_s + \phi_{st} + \varepsilon_{ijst} \quad (3)
\end{aligned}$$

where GTI_t is the google trends index of wave t and the remaining variables have the same definition as before. Note that the GTI is an index from 0 to 100, where higher values represent a greater google search volume for the terms “Lula” and “Bolsonaro”. We are interested in coefficients β_4, β_5 and β_6 , which represent the marginal effect of an increase of the GTI by one unit on the effect of congruence in the respective identity dimension. Importantly, as in all previous analyses, we control for the salience of the football clubs used in the experiment with a similar google trends index. Hence, our estimates control for fluctuations in the relative salience given to specific clubs during the experimental timeline.

Table C.1: Heterogeneity by Treatment Timing: Google Trends Index

Dependent Variables: Treatment Arm Model:	Follow Backs			Blocks		
	Affective only (1)	Political only (2)	Both (3)	Affective only (4)	Political only (5)	Both (6)
Political congruence		0.2006*** (0.0180)	0.1456*** (0.0156)		-0.1222*** (0.0078)	-0.1252*** (0.0107)
Affective congruence	0.1438*** (0.0217)		0.0452*** (0.0137)	-0.0135*** (0.0048)		-0.0591*** (0.0108)
Political congruence × Affective congruence			0.0721*** (0.0200)			0.0518*** (0.0114)
Political congruence × GTI		-0.0003 (0.0011)	0.0001 (0.0008)		-1.83×10^{-5} (0.0003)	-5.33×10^{-5} (0.0006)
Affective congruence × GTI	8.52×10^{-5} (0.0008)		0.0005 (0.0009)	-1.75×10^{-5} (0.0002)		-0.0005 (0.0005)
Political congruence × Affective congruence × GTI			-0.0020** (0.0009)			0.0005 (0.0005)
Wave, Strata Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,388	7,678	15,128	7,199	7,492	14,737
R ²	0.08183	0.10160	0.09854	0.01689	0.07063	0.06773

Notes: This table displays results of the effect of electoral salience, as measured by a Google Trends Index, on follow-back and blocking behaviors. We create a Google Trends Index (GTI) for each experimental wave, equal to the average search volume on Google in Brazil for the terms “Lula” and “Bolsonaro”, on the first two days of each wave. We then use this index to estimate specifications similar to Equation (3). The table shows estimates of this model for treatment arms containing bots that signaled both dimensions of identity or a single one. Standard errors clustered at the bot account level are in parentheses. Significance codes: *** : $p < 0.01$, ** : $p < 0.05$, * : $p < 0.1$.

Appendix Table C.1 shows results using this methodology, both for treatment arms with bots that signaled a single dimension of identity and with bots that signaled both. Overall, we find little evidence of differences in behavior depending on the salience of the election as measured by Google Trends. First, for bots that signal a single dimension of identity (either political or affective), changes in election salience do not seem to change the relative effect of sharing identities. Election salience does have some effect for bots signaling both dimensions,

at least when it comes to follow-backs. First, conditional on not sharing the other identity, there is no effect of electoral salience on the effect of political congruence, nor on the effect of affective congruence. This is seen by the fact that we estimate null effects for β_4 and β_5 in column (3) of Appendix Table C.1. However, for the interaction between political and affective congruence, we obtain a negative effect of the political GTI. This can be interpreted as follows: conditional on bot and subject sharing political identity, an increase of 10 units in the GTI causes a decrease in the effect of affective congruence of approximately 2 percentage points. In other words, when politics is more salient, sharing preference for football clubs becomes relatively less important among those who share political identity. However, this effect is quantitatively small and not supported by the results for blocks, since we find that changes in the GTI did not impact the effect of congruence in each dimension of identity.

Therefore, we find no consistent evidence that subjects' behavior changed significantly according to the election salience or to the campaign calendar, suggesting that the degree of polarization was high throughout the experimental period.